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ARTICLES
THE CONFLUENCE OF EUROPEAN ACTIVISM
AND AMERICAN MINIMALISM: "PATENTABLE
SUBJECT MATTER" AFTER BILSKI
Patrick E. King, Ryan M. Roberts, and Andrew V.
Moshirniat
Abstract
American courts and European jurists continue to struggle to
define the scope of patentability in the recent era of rapid
technological innovation. Though the European and American
systems rely on opposing judicial philosophies and methods of
statutory interpretation, both arrive at the same two-step analytical
framework for determining patentability. This article compares the
explicit European judicial reshaping of a flexible patentability
standard to the Supreme Court's implicit tailoring in its recent
decision Bilski v. Kappos. The comparison clarifies an otherwise
challenging body of precedent and presents a blueprint for future
analysis.
INTRODUCTION
For decades, courts and administrative bodies around the globe
have been vexed by the complex challenge of assessing the
patentability of Information Age technologies that rest on the fringes
of the conventional categories of "patentable subject matter" codified
in national patent statutes. Recently, both the European Patent Office
("EPO") and the Supreme Court of the United States issued important
opinions responding to cries for guidance from practitioners on both
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sides of the Atlantic who have struggled to apply antiquated statutory
frameworks to modem innovations in software coding, business
methods, and other emerging technologies. In Europe, the EPO
Enlarged Board of Appeal ("EBoA") took an activist approach in
deciding Referral G03-08, 1 recasting and rebalancing the patentability
inquiry in service of these new technologies. In the United States, the
Supreme Court took a conservative, minimalist approach in deciding
Bilski v. Kappos,2 and wrapped this judgment tightly in the strict
language of the Patent Act and in century-old precedent. Remarkably,
the EPO and the Supreme Court, traveling on doctrinally antithetical
paths, issued opinions that arrived at the same destination. Both
bodies generously interpret the scope of potentially "patentable
subject matter," and then scrutinize whether an invention is useful,
novel, nonobvious, and clearly delineated in its written description to
determine if a claimed invention is patent-worthy. A comparative
analysis of the remarkably similar approaches birthed from vastly
different textual context and jurisprudence adds clarity to an
otherwise challenging body of United States precedent. As inventions
become more difficult to define in physical terms, courts may place
heightened importance on a novelty analysis, even going so far as to
allow novelty to inform the patentability analysis.
Part I of the Article describes the structure of the European
patent system and summarizes how activist judicial influences in
Europe are transforming the system's historically narrow,
exclusionary view into a more expansive understanding of
patentability. This new conception of "inventiveness" led the EBoA,
in Referral G03-08, to endorse a two-step analytical approach that
focuses on an assessment of the novelty and "inventiveness" of a
claimed invention.
Part II begins with a description of the background of the
American patent system and examines the judicial influences that
shaped and reshaped the standard for patentability in American courts
over the last few decades. This part concludes with a detailed analysis
of the most recent Supreme Court decision analyzing "patentable
subject matter," Bilski v. Kappos. In Bilski, the Court adopted a strict
reading of the language of the Patent Act and looked both at the
1. See Referral G-0003/08, Programs for Computers, I (EPO, May 12, 2010), available
at
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsfl0/DC617IFI82D8B65AC1257721004266
56/$File/G3_08_Opinion 1205201 0 en.pdf [hereinafter Referral G03/08].
2. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010).
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novelty and the scope of the claimed invention, finding that the Bilski
patent claimed an unpatentable "abstract idea." 3
In Part III, we argue that the strikingly dissimilar analytical paths
taken in Europe and in the United States converge on a similar result.
Each system uses a common analytical structure that broadly
recognizes "patentable subject matter," then rigorously applies the
traditional benchmarks for determining patent-eligibility: utility,
novelty, usefulness, and the sufficiency of the written description.
Applying this two-step standard to Supreme Court precedent, we find
surprising consistency and clarity in an otherwise confusing
jurisprudence. This convergence suggests that jurists in both Europe
and America are seeking to accommodate the remarkable pace of
innovation in emerging fields by weakening categorical filters to
patentability.
I. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE ASCENDANCY OF A
PERMISSIVE TEST FOR PATENTABILITY IN EUROPE
European courts and administrative bodies confronted the
difficulty of applying an inflexible statutory exclusion to ever-
changing technologies by adopting an unabashedly activist role and
reinterpreting the statute. These legal actors essentially read away the
European Patent Convention's ("EPC") literal bar on software
patents. Beginning with a statute that included an explicit exclusion of
all computer programs from patent protection, the EPO and courts on
the continent began whittling away at the rigid rule to the point where
it is now a mere formality.4 According to the latest pronouncement of
the EBoA, the mere recitation of "technicality" surmounts the
exclusionary phase of the patentability inquiry.5 Only the second step
in the analysis, the "inventiveness" component, does any work.6 By
reducing the exclusionary test to a hurdle easily cleared with a simple
turn of phrase, Europe has adopted a flexible patentability analysis in
which all computer programs are patentable, provided they meet the
3. See infra Part II.
4. Compare Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 52(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065
U.N.T.S. 199 [hereinafter EPC], with Referral G03/08, supra note 1. The EPC statute also
explicitly excludes "methods for . .. doing business." EPC, art. 52(2). As discussed in Part III-
C, infra, this exclusion may one day face the same fate as the software exclusion in Europe.
5. See Referral G03/08, supra note 1, at 32-33 (citing to Hitachi T 258/03 which "came
to the conclusion that any claim involving technical means was not excluded from patentability
by Article 52(2) EPC").
6. See id. at 31-33.
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European equivalents of novelty and obviousness.
The European patent system is a complex network of judicial
and administrative bodies, operating at local, regional, and
international levels, all of which vie for influence in a vast and
disparate landscape of national patent protections. International
treaties such as the Patent Cooperation Treaty ("PCT") and the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
("TRIPS Agreement") have had only a slight impact on bringing
uniformity to the patent laws in Europe. Recent legislative efforts to
unify the national statutes, specifically the provisions relating to what
is patentable, have failed spectacularly. 9 But momentum continues to
build to implement uniform standards to govern the patentability of
useful inventions in the continent.
The most significant force in the development of a uniform
standard for patentability over the last decade has been the European
Patent Office. The fractured European patent landscape, a hybrid
system of national and supranational authority, has begun to coalesce
around guidance from the EPO.' 0 Increasingly, the EPO is moving
from a traditional, narrow, exclusionary view of patentability towards
an expansive, highly adaptive notion of patentability expressly
designed to capture abstract, non-physical forms of innovation.
7. See id.
8. See John Gladstone Mills III, A Transnational Patent Convention For the Acquisition
and Enforcement of Internal Patent Rights, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 958, 962
(2006) (concluding that such international conventions have "not resulted in large scale-
compliance in the development of uniform patent laws") ("Although international treaties such
as the Paris Convention, the PCT treaty, and the TRIPS Agreement set international standards
for patent protection, these treaties impose minimum standards, not uniform law, and do not
prevent conflicting outcomes in patent cases. None of these instruments requires member states
to provide a method for consolidating claims arising out of similar instances of alleged
infringement. No state is under an obligation to enforce judgments of other members.").
9. See Part I-B, infra. The European Union has recently stepped into the melee on the
legislative side with a proposed directive on computer implemented invention. See generally
Robert Bray, The European Union "Software Patents" Directive: What Is It? Why Is It? Where
Are We Now?, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 11 (2005).
10. See Filing an Application, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE,
http://www.epo.org/patents/Grant-procedure/Filing-an-application.html (last visited Aug. 10,
2010) (One seeking patent protection in Europe may choose to file either individual national
applications, or a single region-wide application); Vicenzo Di Cataldo, From the European
Patent to a Community Patent, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 19, 21 (2002) ("Each national system tends
to harmonize its interpretation of the EPC [European Patent Convention] in accordance with its
own national body of law. Each State uses its own mechanisms to unify the legal interpretations
of the EPC, namely through the power vested in its own unique court of last instance. But ...
there is no mechanism to coordinate the different national interpretations of the EPC on a
supranational level.").
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A. The Structure ofPatent Protections in Europe
In 1973, the EPC created the pan-European patent system
administered by the EPO in an effort to introduce a common
European patent grant procedure." The EPC was amended in 2000,
but the amendments left substantive patent law largely unchanged,
including those provisions relating to "patentable subject matter."1 2
Although both the European Union ("EU") and the EPO are regional
European bodies, their membership is not coextensive.'" The EPC-
signatory countries comprise a broad swath of the European
continent, not all of which are members of the EU.14
Under the Convention, the EPO not only has the power to issue
"European patents," but also the power to hear appeals of these
applications in its quasi-judicial Boards of Appeal.' 5 Among these
Boards of Appeal are twenty-six Technical Boards of Appeal and a
Legal Board of Appeal, all of which hear appeals from the
administrative and examining divisions of the Office.16 In addition to
11. Legal Foundations, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/about-
us/epo/legal-foundations.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2010) (citing the European Patent
Convention 1973 Preamble). The EPO and the Administrative Council, a supervisory body, are
the two organs of the European Patent Organization. Id. Legislative authority within the EPO
lies with the contracting states themselves. Id.
12. See Frequently Asked Questions about the Revised European Patent Convention
(EPC 2000), EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-
texts/archive/epc2000/faq.html#answer9 (last visited Aug. 10, 2010) ("The EPC 2000 leaves
substantive patent law largely unchanged. The main amendments are in Article 54(3),
concerning the novelty-destroying effect of prior European patent applications, and Article
54(5), expressly providing for use-limited product protection for a second or further medical use
of a known substance.").
13. Compare Member States of the European Patent Organization, EUROPEAN PATENT
OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/about-us/epo/member-states.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2010), with
European Countries, EUROPEAN UNION WEBSITE, http://europa.eu/about-eu/27-member-
countries/countries/indexen.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2010).
14. As of August 16, 2010, the thirty-seven EPC-signatory countries are: Albania,
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
See Member States of the European Patent Organization, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE,
http://www.epo.org/about-us/epo/member-states.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2010). Albania,
Croatia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Monaco, Norway, San Marino, Switzerland, and
Turkey are EPC-signatory countries but are not EU members. See European Countries,
EUROPEAN UNION WEBSITE, http://europa.eu/about-eu/27-member-
countries/countries/indexen.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2010).
15. See EPC, supra note 4, art. 21.
16. Boards of Appeal, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/about-us/boards-
of-appeal.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2010); EPC, supra note 4, at art. 21. These divisions
include the Receiving Section and Examining, Legal, and Opposition Divisions. Id The
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these appellate bodies, the EPO has an Enlarged Board of Appeal that
does not serve as an additional level of jurisdiction, but instead is
tasked with maintaining uniform applicability of the law.' 7 The EBoA
may opine on inconsistencies in the law or otherwise important
questions of law if requested by a Board of Appeal or by the President
of the EPO.18 Specifically, a Board of Appeal may refer any question
to the EBoA to ensure uniform applicability of the law or when a
point of law of fundamental importance arises.19 The President of the
EPO may also refer a point of law to the EBoA "where two Boards of
Appeal have given different decisions on that question." 20 As
discussed in more detail below, the exact contours of these grounds
for referral were of great consequence to the latest referral by the EPO
President in that they directly confronted the European approach to
software patentability.
B. The EPO Currently Operates in a Legislative Vacuum
While the EPO has continued to tackle issues of patentability
within its Boards of Appeal, proposals such as the Commission
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions
("CII") have sought to impose uniformity across the continent
21through legislative action. In 2002, the European Commission acted
to harmonize patent laws for software, largely by adopting the EPO
approach.22 The initial incarnation of the proposed CII Directive
Receiving Section is responsible for the examination of formal requirements of a "European
patent" application up to the time when the Examining Division becomes responsible for
substantive examination. Id. at art. 16. The Legal Division is responsible for maintaining the
Register of European Patents which covers matters from registration of inventors to
authorization of attorney representation. See id. at art. 20. The Opposition Division is
responsible for the examination of oppositions against any European Patent, a procedure that
does not have an analogue in the U.S. See id. at art. 19.
17. See Boards of Appeal, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/about-
us/boards-of-appeal.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2010).
18. EPC, supra note 4, arts. 22, 112 (as amended Nov. 29, 2000), available at
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/arl 12.html.
19. Id. at art. 112 (as amended Nov. 29, 2000), available at
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/arl 12.html
20. Id.
21. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions, COM (2002) 92 final (Feb. 20,
2002), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0092:FIN:EN:PDF.
22. See Bray, supra note 9, at 3, 5; see also Robert E. Thomas & Larry A. DiMatteo,
Harmonizing the International Law of Business Method and Software Patents: Following
Europe's Lead, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 23-28 (2007).
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simply attempted to codify existing EPO precedent (and eliminate
business method patents), but the ensuing negotiations generated
significant controversy.23 In 2003, the European Parliament passed a
heavily amended version of the Directive that placed many more
limits on the scope of patentable inventions.24 Although different
bureaucratic bodies objected to the bill's form, and the Legal Affairs
committee voted to abandon the entire process and begin anew,
procedural quirks allowed the bill to reach a final vote.25 In its
amended form, which severely restricted the scope of software
patents, the bill pleased neither the proponents nor opponents of
26
software patents. While software patent supporters felt that the
proposed Directive contained too many ambiguities to serve the
original purpose of harmonization, the detractors disliked that the
Directive acknowledged the patentability of software at all.27 The fact
that the respective memberships of the EU and the EPC do not
completely overlap also added an extra political dimension to the
conflict.2 8 In the final vote, the proposed Directive was roundly
defeated, 14-648.29 Perhaps patent reform is too complex an
undertaking, or simply too politically charged. Regardless, it will
prove a vexing challenge for European legislatures to resolve
complex patentability issues raised by evolving technologies.
C. Listening for a Melody Amidst the Jurisprudential
Cacophony
Although the EPC aimed to harmonize the European patent
system, obvious barriers stand in the way of regional uniformity. For
example, the EPC includes a uniform patent examination and grant
23. See Bray, supra note 9, at 16 ("The Commission's proposal was not that radical.
However, it certainly raised considerable fears amongst small and medium-sized software
developers that their livelihoods and the free software and open source models, sometimes
referred to as 'copyleft,' could be threatened by patents taken out by large industry or purchased
by speculators.").
24. Id. at 120; see also Thomas & DiMatteo, supra note 22.
25. See Bray, supra note 9, at 27; Thomas & DiMatteo, supra note 22, at 28.
26. Thomas & DiMatteo, supra note 22, at 27-28.
27. Id. at 28-29; see also David Gow, Europe Patent Row 'Threatens Jobs and
Invention', THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 15, 2004, at 26, available at
http://www.guardian.co.ukIbusiness/2004/nov/15/europeanunion.
28. See Andreas Grosche, Software Patents - Boon or Bane for Europe?, 14 INT'L J.L. &
INFO. TECH. 257, 262 (2006) (The EU's efforts in pushing the Directive "raised 'concerns
whether the proposed Directive is a Community hidden attempt to circumvent or amend the
relevant restrictive provisions of the EPC."').
29. See EU Throws Out Controversial Hi-Tech Patent Directive, PCPRO.CO.UK, Jul. 6,
2005, http://www.pcpro.co.uk/news/7478 I/eu-throws-out-controversial-hi-tech-patent-directive.
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procedure, but the efforts to create a proper European Community
patent have failed. 30 The result is that a regional EPO application
yields a "European patent" that does not entitle the applicant to
exclusive rights over the entire EPC-signatory area.3 ' Instead, the
"European patent" must be validated by each member state in which
it is to be enforced, yielding a plurality of national level patents but no
single transnational patent.32
Perhaps an even greater barrier to uniformity is the lack of a
supranational patent court of last instance that could enforce a single
interpretation of the EPC provisions. The consequence of this
fragmentation is parallel systems that interpret the same EPC
provisions and often reach different results. Moreover, national courts
typically are bound only by their own decisions and not those of the
EPO." Still, EPO decisions provide a form of persuasive authority
that national courts tend to follow, or at least seek to reconcile with
existing national norms.34
Not only has this tangled system created inconsistency between
and among EPO jurisprudence and that of various national systems,
the situation is further complicated because EPO jurisprudence is not
binding on subsequent EPO tribunals in the sense typically seen in
common-law systems. Arguably the absence of binding authority in
30. Grosche, supra note 28, at 262 (noting that "[p]olitical attempts to create a European
Community patent have stalled for decades").
31. See EPC, supra note 4, art. 2(2).
32. See id.; National Validation, EURPOEAN PATENT OFFICE,
http://www.epo.org/patents/Grant-procedure/Filing-an-application/European-
applications/national-validation.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
33. Grant C. Yang, The Continuing Debate of Software Patents and the Open Source
Movement, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 171, 181 (2005).
34. See, e.g., Aerotel Ltd. V. Telco Holdings Ltd., (2006) EWCA (Civ) 1371, (2006) Info
TLR 215, 1 6(iii)-(iv) ("[D]ecisions of the Boards of Appeal on provisions of the UK Act
intended to implement corresponding provisions of the EPC have 'great persuasive authority'
per Lord Hoffmann in Merrell Dow v Norton. . . . European patent judges ought, so far as they
can, try to be consistent with one another, particularly in relation to the interpretation of national
laws implementing provisions of the EPC."); Kelvin W. Willoughby, How Much Does
Technology Really Matter in Patent Law? A Comparative Analysis of Doctrines of Appropriate
Patentable Subject Matter in American and European Patent Law, 18 Fed. Cir. B.J. 63, 89
(2009) ("[T]he patentability criteria of the EPC [are] very similar to those subsequently included
in the Patent Act of 1977 in the U.K. and in the Patent Act of 1998 in Germany."); Justine Pila,
Software Patents, Separation Of Powers, And Failed Syllogisms A Cornucopia From The
Enlarged Board OfAppeal Of The European Patent Office, OXFORD LEGAL RESEARCH SERIES
31 (2010), http://ssm.com/abstract-1612518 (noting a "requirement that national European
courts interpret their patent legislation in a manner that is consistent with the Boards'
interpretation of the EPC") (citing U.K. Patents Act 1977 § 130(7) and Symbian v. Comptroller-
General of Patents, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 1066, [2009] Bus LR 607).
35. See Referral G03/08, supra note 1, at 13 (citing EPC, supra note 4, at art. 23(3)).
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the common-law tradition has added to volatility in this area of law,
but the EPO Board has taken advantage of this flexibility. EPO judges
are starting to move from a restrictive scope of patentability for
software programs to a more expansive approach.36
D. The EPC's Codification and the EPO's Interpretation of
Statutory Patentability Requirements
The EPC provides protection for "European patents" to the
extent examination shows they fulfill certain conditions, including
novelty, an "inventive step," and an industrial application. 37 These
EPC provisions are analogous to the American concepts of novelty,
nonobviousness, and utility, respectively. 3 8 Inventions must also
avoid exclusion under the EPC's governing provisions on "patentable
subject matter," Articles 52(2) and 52(3). Somewhat deceptively,
Article 52, paragraph 2 of the EPC, excludes from patentability
"schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing
games or doing business, and programs for computers." 9 Article 52,
paragraph 3, goes on to state that "[t]he provisions of paragraph 2
shall exclude patentability of the subject-matter or activities referred
to in that provision only to the extent to which a European patent
application or European patent relates to such subject-matter or
activities as such."40
Although the plain language of Article 52(2) of the EPC seems
to prohibit the patenting of computer programs, the words "as such"
have provided courts and administrative agencies with leeway
sufficient to distinguish between software in its pure form and
otherwise patentable computer programs. 4 1 Over the last twenty
years, the EPO has effectively read the restriction against "programs
for computers" out of Article 52(2) in its struggle to find a test that
42
affords the appropriate protection to inventions in the computer age.
36. See generally Referral G03/08, supra note 1, at 33 ("T 424/03, Microsoft, finally
extended the reasoning applied in T 258/03 to come to the conclusion that a claim to a program
('computer executable instructions' in the claim in question) on a computer-readable medium
also necessarily avoids exclusion from patentability under Article 52(2) EPC. . . . This statement
is quite unequivocal and stands alone as a reason for the claim not to be excluded under Article
52(2) EPC.").
37. EPC, supra note 4, at art. 52(1).
38. See Grosche, supra note 28, at 261 n.31-32.
39. EPC, supra note 4, at art. 52(2).
40. Id. at art. 52(3).
41. See Noam Shemtov, The Characteristics of Technical Character and the Ongoing
Saga in the EPO and the English Courts, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 506, 506-07 (2009).
42. See, e.g., Case T-1 173/97, Computer Program Product I/ IBM, 1999 O.J. EPO 609,
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The doctrine has evolved from a restrictive, narrow test, which
focused on the "technical contribution" of a claimed invention, to an
expansive inquiry that largely reads any "technical" requirement out
of the statute and focuses instead on the novelty and usefulness of a
- 43claimed invention.
The key steps in this evolution are described in a discussion of
the landmark cases below. The EPO's first test, the "contribution
approach" described in Vicom, conflated the separate elements of
"technicality" and "inventiveness."4 The EPO's analysis evolved into
a "technical character" test, as seen in Microsoft. This approach
enforces a crisp separation of the "technicality" analysis from the
"inventiveness" analysis and squarely places the focus of the
patentability inquiry on a patent's "inventiveness" by reducing the
"technicality" hurdle to a claim drafting exercise.45 During this
evolution, the EPO, in BBC, also addressed the related issue of
whether a physical effect on a real world object is required to achieve
a "technical effect" rendering the invention patentable. 4 6 Finally, in
Referral G 03/08, the EBoA formally adopted a methodology where
the "technicality" step does essentially no work and the
"inventiveness" step stands as the bulwark against meritless claims.47
1. Vicom: The "Contribution Approach"
The EPO's first attempt at tackling the issue of software
inventions produced a test now known as the "contribution approach."
In Vicom, the Board formulated this approach in its consideration of a
claimed software patent on an apparatus and methods for digitally
processing images by a software program run on computer
hardware.4 8 To qualify as patentable, the Board required that an
invention make a "technical contribution" to an existing field that was
617 (1999) [hereinafter IBM] ("The appellant also referred to current practice in the US and
Japanese patent offices and pointed out that, according to the recently revised guidelines for
examination in both offices, claims for computer program products are now allowed . . . . [A]s
pointed out by the appellant, these developments represent a useful indication of modem trends.
In the Board's opinion they may contribute to the further highly desirable (world-wide)
harmonization of patent law."); see also Referral G03/08, supra note 1, at 32-33.
43. Referral G03/08, supra note 1, at 31-33.
44. See generally Case T-0208/84, Vicom, 1986 O.J. EPO 14 (1987) [hereinafter Vicom].
45. See Case T-0424/03, Clipboard formats I/Microsoft 1, 9-15 (EPO, Feb. 23, 2006),
available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/biblio/tO3O424eul.htm [hereinafter
Microsoft].
46. See Case T-0163/85, BBC, 1989 O.J. EPO 379 (1990) [hereinafter BBC].
47. See Referral G03/08, supra note 1.
48. Vicom, T-0208/84, supra note 44, at f 10-14.
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not excluded from patentability. 49  Notably, for the purpose of
determining "inventiveness," this test ignored that portion of the
inventor's "technical contribution" that fell within the statutorily
excluded area of software.50 The test also imported considerations of
novelty and "inventiveness" into the "technical" portion of the
patentability analysis by looking to an invention's "technical
contribution" to the prior art.5 1 This interpretation relaxed the Article
52 software prohibition and provides one of the earliest examples of
how European jurists confuse the "patentable subject matter" analysis
with an analysis of the remaining hurdles to patent protection, such as
novelty and "inventiveness." 52
2. Microsoft: The "Technical Character" Test
As the EPO continued to struggle with the treatment of software
programs under its patent system, the Board again liberalized its
analysis and moved to a new "technical character" or "further
technical effect" approach. In Microsoft the Board accepted the
patentability of a software patent directed to a clipboard function, in
which Microsoft claimed "a method in a computer system" and a
"computer-readable medium having computer-executable
instructions."54 As recited by the Board, this "technical character"
49. Id. at 11 15, 16 ("Generally claims which can be considered as being directed to a
computer set up to operate in accordance with a specified program (whether by means of
hardware or software) for controlling or carrying out a technical process cannot be regarded as
relating to a computer program as such and thus are not objectionable under Article 52(2)(c) and
(3) EPC. . . . Generally speaking, an invention which would be patentable in accordance with
conventional patentability criteria should not be excluded from protection by the mere fact that
for its implementation [sic] modern technical means in the form of a computer program are
used. Decisive is what technical contribution the invention as defined in the claim when
considered as a whole makes to the known art.").
50. See Shemtov, supra note 41, at 507.
51. Vicom, T-0208/84, supra note 44, at $ 12-16 (overturning the rejection of a claim
under Article 52(2) (c) and (3) EPC because the recited hardware made a "technical
contribution" outside of an excluded area and thus could not be regarded as part of the prior art).
52. See Shemtov, supra note 41, at 507. See Part II-B infra, for evidence of how this
same confusion permeates U.S. Supreme Court precedent
53. IBM, T-l 173/97, supra note 42 (setting out the "further technical effect" approach,
though in other respects reflecting jurisprudence no longer accepted by the Enlarged Board of
Appeal); see also EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, EPO GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN THE
EPO, Ch. IV, 2.3.6 Programs for Computers, available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-
texts/html/guiex/e/c iv_ 23_6.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2010) ("Such claims may e.g. take the
form of a method of operating said apparatus, the apparatus set up to execute the method, or,
following T 1173/97 (OJ 10/1999, 609), the program itself.") (citing IBM, T-l 173/97).
54. Microsofi, T-0424/03, supra note 45, at 2 (quoting the first claim):
1. A method in a computer system (10) having a clipboard for performing data
transfer of data in a clipboard format, said method comprising the steps of:
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approach follows from an interpretation of Articles 52(1) and 52(2-3)
as distinct provisions.55 The approach more clearly defined what is
essentially a two-part test comprised of independent (1) "technicality"
and (2) "inventiveness" inquiries. Whereas the "contribution
approach" conflated the two provisions by asking the examiner to
determine an item's novelty in the context of previously patentable
fields, the "technical character" test maintained the distinction
,,56between an invention's "technicality" and its "inventiveness.
According to the Board's formulation of the "technicality"
component of the "technical character" approach, the invention must
solve a technical problem by technical means, or in the alternative,
produce a "further technical effect."57 The Board found that a pure
recitation of a hardware embodiment is sufficient to establish
"technical character" on its own. An invention's interactions between
hardware and software are sufficient to establish a "further technical
effect" if these interactions are more than those which would naturally
arise from the implementation of software in the abstract, or a
computer program "as such."58 In Microsoft, the method presented a
technical problem (enhancing the internal operation of a computer)
and a technical means (a clipboard function using the system's
computer memory).59 The Board noted that the claim also satisfied
the "further technical effect" test because "functional data structures
(clipboard formats) [were] used independently of any cognitive
content in order to enhance the internal operation of a computer
system with a view to facilitating the exchange of data among various
providing several clipboard formats including a text clipboard format, a file
contents clipboard format and a file group descriptor clipboard format,
selecting data that is not a file for a data transfer operation,
using the file contents clipboard format to hold said data by
converting said selected data into converted data of said file contents clipboard
format and storing the converted data as a data object,
using the file group descriptor clipboard format to hold a file descriptor holding
descriptive information about the data that is to be encapsulated into a file during
the data transfer operation,
completing the data transfer by providing a handle to said data object,
using said handle to paste said data of said data object to a data sink,
using said descriptive information to enable the computer system to create a file
at the data sink and encapsulating the data object into said file.
55. See id. at 9-10.
56. See Shemtov, supra note 41, at 507-09.
57. Microsoft, T-0424/03, supra note 45, at 10; Referral G03/08, supra note 1, at 32-34.
58. Microsoft, T-0424/03, supra note 45, at 10-11. See Referral G03/08, supra note 1, at
32-34.
59. Microsoft, T-0424/03, supra note 45, at 9-10.
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application programs." 60 Thus, under the "technical character" test of
Microsoft, a software invention that would have been unpatentable
under the prior "contribution approach" because its sole contribution
to "inventiveness" was within an excluded field, was held patentable
by the Board because the invention's features, in their entirety, were
technical in character.6 1
3. BBC: A Potential Physical Effect Test
In addition to defining what subject matter may contribute to the
required "technical character," Boards of Appeal have explored
whether a method's effect on a physical, real world object renders it
patentable, an analysis that is akin to the American "machine-or-
transformation" test discussed in Part II-C-3 below. In BBC, the
Board considered the patentability of a television signal used to
generate a wide-aspect-ratio picture.62 Although the Board considered
the argument that the television signal could be considered a
presentation of information, excluded under Articles 52(2)(d) and (3),
it ultimately found that it was more "than a mere presentation of
information 'as such.',,63 The Board found that this signal "inherently
comprises the technical features of the T.V. system in which it is
being used and if it is considered to present information then it
represents exactly that kind of information which exhibits the
technical features of the system in which it occurs." 64 Thus, the signal
would not be excluded because "it is a physical reality which can
directly be detected by technological means and, therefore, cannot be
considered as an abstract entity, despite its transient character."65
The Board confronted a similar problem in Mitsubishi.66 In that
60. Id. at 10 (internal citations omitted). See Referral G03/08, supra note 1, at 32-34.
61. See Microsoft, T-0424/03, supra note 45, at 11 ("The subject-matter of claim 5 has
technical character since it relates to a computer-readable medium, i.e. a technical product
involving a carrier. Moreover, the computer-executable instructions have the potential of
achieving the above-mentioned further technical effect of enhancing the internal operation of the
computer, which goes beyond the elementary interaction of any hardware and software of data
processing.") (internal citations omitted); Shemtov, supra note 41, at 509.
62. BBC, T-0163/85, supra note 46, (quoting the first claim) ("A colour television signal
adapted to generate a picture with an aspect ratio of greater than 4:3, and in which the active-
video portion of a line constitutes at least 85% and preferably 90% of the line period.").
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Case T-0190/94, Image rotating system having an arbitrary angle/Mitsubishi, 14-15
(Oct. 26, 1995) [hereinafter Mitsubishi] (noting that an otherwise unpatentable algorithm for
rotating an image by an arbitrary angle avoided exclusion because it "manifests itself in the real
world in a technical effect on a physical entity").
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case, the claim in question recited a system for rotating an image by
an arbitrary angle by means of an algorithm. 67 The appellant argued
that the contribution made to the art by the difference between the
claimed invention and the prior art was solely due to the mathematical
algorithm.68 The Board rejected this reasoning:
[T]he quantitative effects on the image pixels in terms of rotation
angles, in the third skew transformation and consequently in its
quantitative relationship with the other two transformations within
the overall rotation of the image, do not appear to be the same in
the claimed as in the known system, the difference between these
two systems manifests itself in the real world in a technical effect
on a physical entity. [. . .] The claimed system thus making a
contribution to the art in a field not excluded (by Article 52(2)/(3)
EPC) from patentability, the subject-matter of the Claim is to be
regarded as an invention within the meaning of Article 52(1)
67. Id. at 4-6 (citing the first claim):
A system for rotating an image by an arbitrary angle comprising;
an image memory for storing two-dimensional image data (121);
a transformation angle determining section (I 11) for determining both a skew
angle (Tx) in a horizontal direction and a skew angle (Ty) in a vertical direction of
the original two-dimensional image data stored in said image memory, based on a
desired rotation angle (T);
a first X-axis skew transformation section (112) for obtaining second two-
dimensional image data (122) which results from skewing first two-dimensional
image data stored in said image memory as the original two-dimensional image
data in a horizontal direction by the angle as determined by said transformation
angle determining section;
a Y-axis skew transformation section (113) for obtaining third two-dimensional
image data (123) which results from skewing said second two-dimensional image
data in a vertical direction by the angle as determined by said transformation
angle determining section; and
a second X-axis skew transformation section (114) for obtaining fourth two-
dimensional image data (124) which results from skewing said third two-
dimensional image data in a horizontal direction once again by the angle as
determined by said transformation angle determining section (111);
- wherein the skew transformation for implementing the rotation processing is
performed with skew transformation matrices represented by the following
equations without needing arithmetic operations of affine transformation:
1 - tanT/2 1 0
?I = ?3 =) and ?= ()
0 1 sinT 1
- where ?1, ?3 represent the first and second skew transformation in the X-
direction and where ?2 represents the skew transformation in the Y-direction and
wherein the rotation angle (T) is determined from the equations:
T = T/2 and T = arctan(sinT).
68. Id. at 9-10.
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EPC.69
The Board was quick to find that this physical effect on a real world
object served to avoid statutory exclusion; but, as seen in the
President's referral to the EBoA (discussed in more detail below),
there was a lingering question whether such physical effect was
necessary, or merely a sufficient means of achieving a "technical
effect." 70
Despite the uncertainty surrounding a physical effect
requirement, the end result of evolving EPO jurisprudence was that
the patentability inquiry was largely pro forma. If it is sufficient for
patentability to recite "technicality" (claim that the invention includes
some technical feature) even if the feature does not predominate,n
then the "inventiveness" component provides the principal tool to
determine patentability. In this way, the "technical character" test
sidesteps the exclusion for software in Article 52, establishing a
patentability doctrine in which all computer programs are patentable,
provided that their claims are suitably inventive. 72
4. Confusion and Referral to the EPO's Enlarged Board of
Appeal
As the EPO actively reinterpreted EPC Article 52 in an attempt
to grapple with new technologies, national courts across Europe
struggled to harmonize their jurisprudence with the EPO's shifting
paradigm. For example, in Aerotel,73 the Court of Appeal in the
United Kingdom noted its discomfort with disparate EPO case law
and implored the President to initiate a referral to the EBoA:
The decisions of the EPO Boards of Appeal are mutually
contradictory.... [S]urely the time has come for matters to be
clarified by an Enlarged Board of Appeal. Under Art. 112(1)(b) of
the EPC the President of the EPO has the power to refer a point of
law to an Enlarged Board where two Boards of Appeal have given
different decisions on that question. That is now clearly the
position. There are indeed at least four differing points of view.74
Not long after Aerotel, the EPO President, pursuant to EPC Article
69. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
70. See discussion infra Part 1-4.
71. See Case T-0154/04, Estimating sales activity/Duns Licensing Associates 8-9 (ETO,
Nov. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Duns Licensing].
72. See Microsoft, T-0424/03, supra note 45.
73. Aerotel, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371. The test was later confirmed in U.K. courts by
Symbian Ltd v. Comptroller General of Patents, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 1066. Shemtov, supra
note 41, at 506, 509-10.
74. Aerotel, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, at l25.
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1 12(1)(b), filed a referral with the EBoA claiming that the recent EPO
interpretations regarding software patents represented divergent
"application[s] of the law" in an area of "fundamental importance."
The Referral posed four questions related to the patentability of
software, tackling the most controversial issues. 76
On May 12, 2010, the EPO EBoA handed down an opinion on
Referral G 03/08, concluding that EBoA need not resolve a conflict in
case law.7 7 The EBoA attributed the confusion expressed by national
courts to the Technical Boards' different interpretation of the different
claim language. The perceived divergence was not evidence of
judicial inconsistency but represented a legitimate development in an
evolving body of law. 79 As the EBoA may only rule to correct
inconsistencies, it determined that in the absence of divergent case
law, the President's referral was improper.8 0 Accordingly, the EBoA
75. See Referral G03/08, supra note 1, at 1.
76. See id. at 24-51 (questions 1-4).
1) Can a computer program only be excluded as a computer program as such if it
is explicitly claimed as a computer program?
2) (a) Can a claim in the area of computer programs avoid exclusion under Art.
52(2)(c) and (3) merely by explicitly mentioning the use of a computer or a
computer-readable storage medium?
(b) If Question 2(a) is answered in the negative, is a further technical effect
necessary to avoid exclusion, said effect going beyond those effects inherent
in the use of a computer or data storage medium to respectively execute or
store a computer program?
3) (a) Must a claimed feature cause a technical effect on a physical entity in the
real world in order to contribute to the technical character of the claim?
(b) If Question 3(a) is answered in the positive, is it sufficient that the
physical entity be an unspecified computer?
(c) If Question 3(a) is answered in the negative, can features contribute to the
technical character of the claim if the only effects to which they contribute are
independent of any particular hardware that may be used?
4) (a) Does the activity of programming a computer necessarily involve technical
considerations?
(b) If Question 4(a) is answered in the positive, do all features resulting from
programming thus contribute to the technical character of a claim?
(c) If Question 4(a) is answered in the negative, can features resulting from
programming contribute to the technical character of a claim only when they
contribute to a further technical effect when the program is executed?
77. See id. at 17 ("Development of the law is an essential aspect of its application,
whatever method of interpretation the judge applies, and is therefore inherent in all judicial
activity. In that light an element of legal development can even be seen whenever a specific case
is subsumed under an abstract regulation. That is especially true of Anglo-Saxon law, where a
decision on an individual case has far greater implications as a precedent than judgments in
continental civil law. Consequently, legal development as such cannot on its own form the basis
for a referral, only because case law in new legal territory does not always develop in linear
fashion, and earlier approaches may be abandoned or modified.").
78. See id. at 18-20.
79. See id. at 26 (noting that the recognition that the claim form was relevant, allowing
recitation of "technicality" by claiming a physical embodiment, was a legitimate development in
the law) (citing Microsoft, T-0424/03 (2006)).
80. See id. at 48, 50.
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devoted a majority of the opinion to a discussion of EPC referral
procedure.
At first blush, this result appears neutral, but the text of the
opinion signals support for the liberal "technical character," two-step
approach, and a rejection of the increasingly antiquated physicality
requirements.81 The Referral consisted of four questions, two of
which are relevant to this Article: (1) can a claim sidestep exclusion
by merely reciting "technicality"; and (2) must a claimed feature act
on a real world physical object in order to cause a "technical effect"
that contributes to "technical character?"82 In its answer to the
President's questions, the EBoA struck a progressive chord, explicitly
noting the need for evolving standards in such a volatile field:
Particularly in the field of new technologies, the Technical Boards
often have to subject their established case law to critical
review . . . . It is entirely conceivable that the interpretation of
undefined legal terms in the light of the EPC's purpose and
principles will necessitate drawing further distinctions which,
depending on what they include or exclude, may determine
whether a patent is granted or refused in a specific case. [. . .] Thus
even a radical shift in jurisprudence need not necessarily be
construed as a different decision within the meaning of Article
112(1)(b) EPC vis-A-vis earlier case law, provided that the Board
corrects itself and - mostly in explicit fashion - declares its earlier
practice to be no longer relevant.
Addressing the President's concern that the subject-matter patent
exclusions could be easily avoided merely by reciting "technicality"
in the patent application, the EBoA noted that while an earlier
decision considered the manner of the claim to be irrelevant,84 a more
recent decision highlighted the importance of claim form." The
Microsoft decision held that simple recitation of embodiment in a
81. See EBoA Confirms EPO Approach to Computer Programs, May 12, 2010,
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/topics/news/2010/20100512.html. Indeed, the
EPO touted the decision as a confirmation of recent EPO computer jurisprudence. Id One
commentator noted that the result left the EPO "jubilant." See Florian Mueller, German High
Court Declares All Software Potentially Patentable, Foss PATENTS BLOG 5 (May 19, 2010),
http://fosspatents.blogspot.com/2010/05/german-high-court-declares-all-software.html.
82. See Referral G03/08, supra note 1, at 24, 48. Question 2 of the referral, not discussed
in this article, raised a question about a divergent treatment of "computer programs" and
"computer-implemented" methods. The Enlarged Board rejected the contention that a computer
program and a computer-implemented method are the same thing and thus ruled that there was
no divergence. See David Sant, Nick Beckett & Isabel Davies, Patentability of Computer
Programs: EPO Referral Held by Enlarged Board to be Inadmissible, MONDAQ, May 25, 2010,
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=101266.
83. Referral G 03/08, supra note 1, at 18-19.
84. See id. at 26 (citing IBM, T-1 173/97 (1998)).
85. See id. (citing Microsoft, T-0424/03 (2006)).
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physical medium is sufficient to avoid exclusion under EPC Article
52(2).86 As the EBoA explained:
Microsoft ... [came] to the conclusion that a claim to a
program ... on a computer-readable medium ... necessarily
avoids exclusion .. . [because] the subject-matter of [the claim] ...
relates to a computer-readable medium. [. . .] This statement is
quite unequivocal and stands alone as a reason for the claim not to
be excluded under Article 52(2) EPC.87
In answering the President's question, the EBoA, though recognizing
that there appeared to be differing case law regarding the presentation
of claims for a computer program, found that the divergence
represented a legitimate development in the law.88 Whereas claimants
were previously required to show "technicality," they are now
required only to state such. Essentially gutting the initial
"technicality" determination, the Board promoted the more adaptable
"inventive step" requirement that assesses the software invention on
* . 89its merits.
In the EBoA's answer to the President's question regarding a
"technical effect" on a physical entity, it further endorsed a
permissive approach. Citing BBC and Mitsubishi, discussed above,
the President's Referral asked whether the prior Board decisions
required a physical effect. 90 The EBoA simply rejected the contention
that these cases instituted such a requirement:
The second problem with the alleged divergence is that the
decisions T 163/85 and T 190/94, said in the referral to require a
technical effect on a physical entity in the real world, simply did
not do so. They merely accepted this as something sufficient for
avoiding exclusion from patentability; they did not state that it was
91
necessary.
This determination was a remarkable shift from the "contribution
approach" and embraced the possibility that a particular software
program may exhibit sufficient "technicality" without recitation of a
86. Id.
87. Id. at 33 (citing Microsoft, T-0424/03, supra note 45).
88. Id. at 26 (citing Microsoft, T-0424/03, supra note 45).
89. See id. at 42 (praising Duns Licensing, T 154/04, supra note 71, and the "inventive
step" requirement as a "practicable system for delimiting innovations for which a patent may be
granted.").
90. Id. at 48-50 (citing BBC, T-0163/85, supra note 46, and Mitsubishi, supra note 66).
91. Id. at 50.
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hardware embodiment. 92
Continuing to reference a permissive approach to patentability,
in an unrelated section of the opinion, the EBoA sua sponte took the
opportunity to clarify the "further technical effect" approach adopted
in IBM.9 3 Specifically, the EBoA noted that the mere act of running
software on a computer does not afford a software program sufficient
"technical effects" to overcome exclusion because such a rule would
render "software as such" patentable. 94 Anything beyond this most
basic interaction, however, would presumably qualify as a "further
technical effect," rendering the program patentable under the EPC.
Thus, while the EBoA's opinion stops short of setting out a
definitive rule to govern software patenting, it was a resounding
reaffirmation of the need for a flexible approach to patentability in the
face of quickly changing technology. Emanating from the Referral's
underlying rationale are key insights to the treatment of software
inventions that signal a permissive and adaptable European
patentability doctrine. The EBoA endorsed the liberal two-step
approach of recent Boards of Appeal which relegated the exclusion
test to a near-formality that can be surpassed by mere recitation of
"technicality" and lets the more flexible "inventive step" test act as a
filter. 95 Additionally, the EBoA confirmed that a physical impact on a
real world object is merely sufficient, and not necessary to provide a
"technical effect" and avoid exclusion under Article 52(2).96
By adopting a methodology that essentially reads out of the
analysis a rigid "technicality" step and places great emphasis on the
more flexible and dynamic "inventiveness" step, the Board has set out
an analysis that preserves flexibility in the face of evolving
technologies while promoting the patenting of only inventive
discoveries. Software patents are to be judged on their merits and not
by a rigid and artificial bright-line rule.97 A recent German High
92. Note the striking similarity to Bilski's holding that the "machine-or-transformation"
test is sufficient but not necessary to render a process patentable over the abstract idea
exclusion. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010).
93. IBM, T- 1173/97, supra note 42, at 26 (the claim in IBM that the Board determined to
be patentable was for a computer program product, directly loaded onto the memory of a
computer, that carries out a method for resource recovery inside the computer).
94. Id. at 16.
95. See id. at 14-15.
96. See id. at 14.
97. See Referral G 03/08, supra note 1, at 42 (praising Duns Licensing, T 154/04, supra
note 71, and the "inventive step" requirement as a "practicable system for delimiting
innovations for which a patent may be granted.").
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Court opinion, 9 8 Siemens (discussed below) is evidence that national
courts are in fact adhering to the EPO's recommended approach. 99
E. The German High Court Follows the Lead of the EPO
The development of EPO jurisprudence that effectively
disregards the "technicality" requirement for patentability, and relies
instead on the remaining requirements of novelty and
"inventiveness," could arguably be dismissed as unique to this
singular patent organization. But a recent opinion from a German
court signals that national courts are also willing to adopt this
approach. In Siemens, the German High Court considered a method
for dynamically generating structured documents in resource-limited
host computers or servers. oo Consistent with the latest EPO
98. The official name for Germany's court of last resort for civil and criminal matters is
the Federal Court of Justice ("Bundesgerichtshof').
99. See Case Xa ZB 20/08 ("Dynamische Dokumentengenerierung") at 16,
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 22, 2010, Entscheidungen des
Bundespatentgerichts [BPatGE] (F.R.G.), available at
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgibin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht-bgh&Art-en&sid
=c3acfl 29057d2a2b 1 7474357d41370cc&nr-51989&pos=0&anz= 1 [hereinafter Siemens]. All
discussions of the opinion and quotes from the same are based on an unofficial English
translation of the German High Court's opinion.
100. Id. at 4-5.
1. The patent application on which the appeal is based relates, according to its
Patent Claim 1, to a method for dynamically generating structured documents,
(1) which is carried out on at least one microcontroller-based host computer
(1.1) that has limited resources and
(1.2) that communicates with a client,
(2) comprising the following method steps:
(2.1) requirement data from the client is received at the host
computer,
(2.2) request parameters are extracted from the requirement data,
(2.3) the request parameters are mapped by a control module to a
command set of an interface module of the host computer,
(2.3.1) with the interface module being software-
architecture-specific.
(2.4) the structured document is generated dynamically
(2.4.1) using at least one template document that contains
calls of service takers,
(2.5) with instructions of the service takers being extracted by the
interface module and mapped to a corresponding command set
of the interface module,
(2.5.1) with the command set being limited to a subsection
of the service takers,
(2.6) the instructions
(2.6.1) are executed in a runtime environment of the control
module with reference to the mapped request
parameters and
(2.6.2) define contents and/or structure of the structured
document after execution is completed,
(2.7) the dynamically generated structured document is transferred
to the client.
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jurisprudence, the German court applied a two-step patentability
inquiry that asks first whether the claimed invention poses a technical
solution to a technical problem. 0' The lower court found that
although the invention solved a technical problem (enabling
structured documents to be dynamically generated on host computers
with limited capacity), it did not disclose a technical solution because
the method was based on "conceptual considerations that led to the
proposal of providing a specific software module and, in this way,
optimizing the system-near software." 02 Rejecting this formulation of
"technical character," the German High Court noted that the technical
means or problem can be met by recitation of a data processing
unit, 03 and that the technical solution requirement will be satisfied if
a computer program takes into account the features of the components
on which the method is intended to run:
A technical means for solving a technical problem does not only
exist if device components are modified or addressed in a
fundamentally different matter. Instead, it is sufficient if the
routine of a data processing program that is used for solving the
problem is determined by technical circumstances outside of the
data processing unit and if the solution consists in the very fact that
a data processing program is designed such that it takes into
account the technical circumstances of the data processing
104program.
The court found that whether the claim is drafted in an abstract
manner, and not confined to concrete measures of a limited command
set, is not a concern of patentability, but rather a consideration to be
analyzed under the remaining patentability requirements of novelty
and "inventiveness." 05 Thus, under the guidance of the German High
Court, essentially all computer-implemented software programs are
potentially patentable because, in practice, all programs must take
into account the different properties and performance of hardware and
software components.lo0
101. Id at 13-14. See also Mueller, German High Court Declares All Software Potentially
Patentable, supra note 81 (noting the previous strict rule: "a patented invention to put
'controllable forces of nature' to use to achieve a predictable effect. Software all by itself can't
do that, so that principle only allowed software to be part of a traditional technical invention.").
102. Siemens, case Xa ZB 20/08, supra note 99, at 15.
103. Id. at 13.
104. Id. at 15-16.
105. Id at 16 ("That the teaching is not limited to the concrete measures for mapping
request parameters to a limited command set, but rather is formulated abstractly, is to be taken
into consideration in the still remaining examination of novelty and inventive step.").
106. See id. at 15-16. See also Mueller, German High Court Declares All Software
Potentially Patentable, supra note 8 1.
267
268 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 27
The European patent system, at the intra-national and
increasingly the national level, is now guided by a two-step
patentability inquiry in which claims clear the initial exclusionary
"technicality" hurdle by mere recitation of "technicality," and the
second "inventiveness" component performs the heavy-lifting in
denying unworthy inventions the protection of the patent laws. Is the
methodology a clever construct of activist European jurists or the
natural resting place of any patentability analysis that seeks to
accommodate the unpredictable pace and direction of invention in the
Information Age? A close analysis of the evolution of "patentable
subject matter" jurisprudence in the United States suggests an answer.
In America, jurists apply a fundamentally different minimalist judicial
philosophy to decades-old statutes and centuries-old case law, yet
reach essentially the same result.
II. JUDICIAL MINIMALISM: BEHIND THE CURTAIN OF
TEXTUAL PATENTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Nearly contemporaneously with their European counterparts,
courts in the United States confronted the same difficulties
reconciling antiquated notions of patentability with the rapidly
transforming world of information technology. In the years leading up
to the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Bilski, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the "Federal Circuit"),
pursued a path of patent jurisprudence that sought to address the
patentability of mutable technologies through a judicially-created
evolving series of bright-line tests. 107 In recent years, the Federal
Circuit weathered a storm of political and public criticism for its
perceived activism.10 8 Increasingly, the Supreme Court has weighed
in on a number of patent topics that were previously considered the
exclusive purview of the Federal Circuit. With its decision in Bilski,
the Supreme Court, for the first time since Congress established the
Federal Circuit, addressed the question of patentability and rejected
the Federal Circuit's bright-line tests. The Supreme Court refreshed a
minimalist approach to statutory interpretation that broadly construed
the categories of "patentable subject matter" in § 101 of the Patent
Act and restrictively applied traditional conditions and requirements
to patentability codified in other provisions of the statute.
107. See generally, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346
(Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
108. See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as "Prime Percolator": A Prescription for
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 659 (2009).
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A. Section 101 of the Patent Act and Common-Law Exceptions
At the heart of the American doctrine of "patentable subject
matter" is § 101 of the United States Patent Act: "[w]hoever invents
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title."l 09 The Patent Act further defines the term
"process": "[t]he term 'process' means process, art or method, and
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material."o Three extra-textual exceptions,
arising from long-established Supreme Court case law, bind § 101's
permissive statutory basis of "patentable subject matter."' These
common-law exclusions consist of the familiar categories of (1) laws
of nature, (2) physical phenomena, and (3) abstract ideas.112
B. Benson, Flook, and Diehr: The Supreme Court Sketches the
Contours ofPatentability
In a trilogy of cases that form the foundation of Supreme Court
patentability analysis, the Court clarified the limitations that the three
extra-textual exclusions place on the scope of patentable processes.' 13
In 1972, the Court issued the first of these opinions, Gottschalk v.
Benson. 114 The patent in Benson claimed an algorithm for converting
binary-coded decimal numbers into pure binary numbers. 1 ' The
conversion between these two systems can be done mentally in
successive steps of multiplication and addition.116 The Court held that
the claim at issue was not a process, but an unpatentable abstract
109. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
110. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006).
111. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). ("The Court's precedents provide
three specific exceptions to § 101's broad patent-eligibility principles: 'laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas.' While these exceptions are not required by the statutory text,
they are consistent with the notion that a patentable process must be 'new and useful.' And, in
any case, these exceptions have defined the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare
decisis going back 150 years.") (internal citations omitted).
112. Id.
113. See generally Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64-67 (1972) ("[a] principle, in the
abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one
can claim in either of them an exclusive right"); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (the
exclusion of abstract ideas from patentable subject matter cannot be circumvented by limiting
the formula to a particular field or by insignificant postsolution activity); Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (while abstract ideas are not patentable, "an application of a law of nature
or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection").
114. Benson, 409 U.S. at 63.
115. Id. at 67, 71, 73.
116. Id. at 66-67.
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idea." 7 Allowing a patent on the claim in question, the Court
explained, "would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in
practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself."" 8
Six years later, in 1978, the Court again considered the
patentability of processes in Parker v. Flook. "9 The Flook patent
claimed a procedure for monitoring the catalytic conversion process
in the petrochemical and oil-refining industries.12 0 This process
consisted of three steps: a temperature measurement, the calculation
of an updated alarm limit with an algorithm, and the adjustment of the
alarm limit with the calculated new value.12' The Court noted that,
unlike the process in Benson, the Flook patent would not wholly
preempt the use of the algorithm in question because it was limited to
specific industries, but that the algorithm was the application's only
innovation. 12 2 Noting that issuing a patent based on these limitations
would be exalting form over substance, the Court rejected "[tihe
notion that post-solution activity [in this case the adjustment of the
alarm limit to the figure computed according to the formula], no
matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an
unpatentable principle into a patentable process." 2 3 Thus, Flook
stands for the proposition that the prohibition against patenting
abstract ideas "cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use
of the formula to a particular technological environment ... [or by
adding] insignificant postsolution activity." 24
Finally, in 1981, the Court issued its opinion in Diamond v.
Diehr, limiting and clarifying the principles laid out in Benson and
Flook.12 5 Considering an application claiming a process for curing
rubber that used a mathematical formula to complete certain steps in
the process, the Court explained that while an abstract idea, law of
nature, or mathematical formula could not be patented, "an
application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection." 26 In
Diehr, the Court held that the claim for a rubber-curing process fell
within the scope of "patentable subject matter" because it claimed an
117. Id. at 71-72.
118. Id. at 72.
119. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
120. Id at 585-86.
121. Id at 585.
122. Id. at 585, 589-90, 594-95.
123. Id. at 590.
124. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981) (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 584).
125. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175.
126. Id. at 187.
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application of a mathematical formula rather than the mathematical
formula itself.12 7
Thus, by the early 1980s, the Court had laid the groundwork of a
flexible "patentable subject matter" doctrine and described in broad
strokes the contours of the analysis. In practice, however, drawing a
line between the principles of Benson and Flook and the limitation of
Diehr proved difficult.' 28 For several decades following Diehr, lower
courts repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to distill the Court's
guidance into a concrete framework.12 9
C. The Federal Circuit Attempts to Craft a Bright-line Test
from the Supreme Court's Holdings
Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 to bring uniformity
and predictability to the laws that govern the grant and enforcement
of patents.13 0 Since that time, the Federal Circuit has overseen the
expanded protection of patents and the implementation of predictable
rules to define the scope of patentability and the reach of patent
holders' rights.' 3  The Federal Circuit is unique among the Courts of
Appeal in the United States as the only court that claims jurisdiction
based wholly upon subject matter rather than geographic location. 132
In the United States, patent cases are subject to exclusive federal
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). An action for patent
infringement may be filed in any District Court, subject to applicable
127. Id. at 192-93.
128. See e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502,
507-508 (D. Mass. 1996) (Struggling with the concepts laid out in Benson and Diehr: "This
distinction between abstract idea an patentable subject matter, however, is more easily stated
than applied.... The determination of patentability of computer software is particularly difficult
because a computer program directs the computer to perform mathematical functions (i.e.,
process data) to achieve a desired result."); Schlafly v. Pub. Key Partners, 1997 WL 542711, *4
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 1997) ("This concept, that laws of nature, natural phenomenon and abstract
ideas are not patentable, is difficult to apply in the context of computer-related technology.
However, some guidance can be found in Supreme Court and Federal Circuit cases."); GMIS,
Inc. v. Health Payment Review, Inc., 1995 WL 27148, *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 1995) (describing
the theories of patentability in Diehr and Benson as "radically divergent"); Arrhythmia Research
Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Rader, J., concurring)
("The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Corazonix because 'the claims of the
'459 patent are drawn to a nonstatutory mathematical algorithm and, as such, are unpatentable
pursuant to the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101." This erroneous conclusion illustrates the
confusion caused by Benson and its progeny.").
129. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
130. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164 § 165, 96 Stat. 50
(1982); see Golden, supra note 108, at 664-65.
131. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000).
132. See id.
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jurisdiction and venue constraints.' 3 3 Thereafter, patent cases diverge
from the route taken by non-patent federal cases and are appealable
only to the Federal Circuit.134 Following a Federal Circuit decision,
parties may petition for review to the Supreme Court as a court of last
resort. 13 5 In the first twenty years of the Federal Circuit, the Supreme
Court rarely reviewed patent cases and left to the Federal Circuit the
task of developing patent-specific case law.' 36 During this period of
Supreme Court silence, the Federal Circuit was the de facto court of
last resort for patent cases in the United States.' 37 Building on the
existing body of Supreme Court precedent-primarily the holdings of
Benson, Flook, and Diehr-the Federal Circuit created a series of
extra-statutory "tests" designed to delineate the reach of § 101.138
1. The Freeman-Walter-Abele Test
The Freeman-Walter-Abele test, created by the United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, a predecessor court to the
Federal Circuit,139 was the first of these tests. It described a two-step
process for determining whether a patent using a mathematical
algorithm was patentable: "(1) determining whether the claim recites
an 'algorithm' within the meaning of Benson, then (2) determining
whether that algorithm is 'applied in any manner to physical elements
or process steps."'l 4 0 The test was problematic because, contrary to
Supreme Court precedent, it explicitly prevented courts from
evaluating claims as a whole and introduced the possibility that
claims would be rejected based on individual elements and
limitations.' 4 1 The Federal Circuit later found this test unworkable
and fashioned a replacement.142
133. See ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 151 (1999).
134. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000); Golden, supra note 108, at 664-65.
135. See SUP. CT. R. 10.
136. Golden, supra note 108, at 664-65.
137. See id ("In recent years, the Supreme Court has tended to grant no more than about
ninety petitions from the several thousand filed in each year-long term. According to my tally, in
any term out of the last twenty-five, no more than three such grants have been directed to patent
questions.").
138. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
139. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164 §165, 96 Stat. 50
(merging the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the appeals division of
United States Court of Claims).
140. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959 (citing In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
141. See id.
142. See State St., 149 F.3d at 1374 ("After Diehr and Chakrabarty, the Freeman-Walter-
Abele test has little, if any, applicability to determining the presence of statutory subject matter.
As we pointed out in Alappa,... application of the test could be misleading, because a process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter employing a law of nature, natural
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2. State Street Bank: The "Useful, Concrete, and Tangible
Result" Test
State Street Bank, a case notorious for its judicial activism, 14 3
introduced two controversial ideas. First, the Federal Circuit
articulated a new patentability test that looked to whether the process
produced a "useful, concrete, and tangible result."1 4 4 Second, the
Federal Circuit determined in State Street that business methods are
patentable processes, opening the flood gates to subject matter
previously thought to be beyond the scope of patent protection.14 5
Over the next decade, the Federal Circuit modified its
pronouncement in State Street slightly, but the overall framework
remained intact. In 2007, the Federal Circuit issued two opinions
slightly constricting the scope of patentability. 146 In In re Comiskey,
the court considered a business method claim directed to a mandatory
arbitration process that covered a series of steps performed by human
beings.147 The court ruled that such claims were unpatentable mental
processes, but held that other claims that added the additional
requirement of using a computer to execute the process were
patentable under the "useful, concrete, and tangible result" test.14 8 In
In re Nuiften, the patent at issue claimed a technique for reducing the
distortion of electronic signals caused by electronic watermarking.14 9
For example, claim 14 was directed to "[a] signal with embedded
supplemental data, the signal being encoded in accordance with a
given encoding process . . . ."so In rejecting the claim as
phenomenon, or abstract idea is patentable subject matter even though a law of nature, natural
phenomenon, or abstract idea would not, by itself, be entitled to such protection.. . . [A]fter
Diehr and Alappat, the mere fact that a claimed invention involves inputting numbers,
calculating numbers, outputting numbers, and storing numbers, in and of itself, would not render
it nonstatutory subject matter, unless, of course, its operation does not produce a 'useful,
concrete and tangible result."' (citing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994))).
143. See David J. Kappos et al., A Technological Contribution Requirement for Patentable
Subject Matter: Supreme Court Precedent and Policy, 6 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 152,
163-65 (2008).
144. State St., 149 F.3d at 1373.
145. Kappos et al., supra note 143, at 164. See State St., 149 F.3d at 1373, 1377.
146. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
147. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1368 ("Comiskey's patent application No. 09/461,742
claims a method and system for mandatory arbitration involving legal documents, such as wills
or contracts. According to the application, the claimed "program ... requires resolution by
binding arbitration of any challenge or complaint concerning any unilateral document ... [or]
contractual document.").
148. Id. at 1378-80.
149. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1348.
150. Id. at 1351. ("A signal with embedded supplemental data, the signal being encoded in
accordance with a given encoding process and selected samples of the signal representing the
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unpatentable, the Federal Circuit held that electrical or
electromagnetic signals are not statutory subject matter under the
Patent Act. 5' Thus, the Federal Circuit slightly recast and narrowed
the rule set forth in State Street but preserved the overall structure of
the analysis. 152
3. In re Bilski: The "Machine-or-Transformation" Test
A decade after State Street, the Federal Circuit once again found
its earlier pronouncement unsatisfactory and, in In re Bilski,
introduced a more rigid patentability test. The Bilski patent claims a
process that explains "how buyers and sellers of commodities in the
energy market can protect, or hedge, against the risk of price
changes."15 3 Independent claims 1 and 4 of Bilski's application
explained the concept of hedging, and later dependent claims
explained the use of hedging in energy markets.1 54 The Federal
Circuit, sitting en banc, 1s rejected the claims for failure to the meet a
newly defined "machine-or-transformation" test, which the court
characterized as a requirement of patentability.15 6
This "machine-or-transformation" test asks whether the process
is "(1) . . . tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) . . .
transforms a particular article into a different state or thing." 57 The
court seemingly took pains to ground its "machine-or-transformation"
supplemental data, and at least one of the samples preceding the selected samples is different
from the sample corresponding to the given encoding process.").
151. Id. at 1353 (citing State St., 149 F.3d at 1375).
152. Kappos et al., supra note 143, at 166.
153. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3220 (2010).
154. See id (citing U.S. Patent Application No. 08/833,892 (filed Apr. 10, 1997)):
1. A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by
a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of:
(a)initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and
consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase said
commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said fixed rate
corresponding to a risk position of said consumer;
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-
risk position to said consumers; and
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider
and said market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of
market participant transactions balances the risk position of said series of
consumer transactions.
2. The method of claim I wherein said commodity is energy and said market
participants are transmission distributors.
155. The Federal Circuit's opinion actually consisted of five different opinions, including
one concurrence and three dissents. See generally In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (2008).
156. Id. at 954 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)).
157. Id.
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test in Supreme Court precedent, citing extensively to Benson, Flook,
and Diehr.'58  Still, dissenting judges accused the majority of
overstepping the bounds of its judicial authority and disregarding the
Supreme Court's demands for judicial restraint found in several
earlier Supreme Court patentability decisions. 159 The dissenting
judges' opinions proved prescient. The majority's efforts to avert
another rebuke from the Supreme Court by drafting a scholarly
opinion and exhaustively detailing past precedent1 6 0  proved
unsuccessful.
D. The Backlash Against Perceived Federal Circuit Activism
After significantly expanding the scope of patentability and the
power of patents in the decades of its supremacy, the Federal Circuit
saw a recent sharp turn in public and political opinion reflected in
both legislative and judicial activity. Congress has and continues to
vigorously debate a broad amendment to the Patent Act that would
restrict the scope of patent grants and protections."6 The American
158. See id at 956 ("Therefore, we believe our reliance on the Supreme Court's machine-
or-transformation test as the applicable test for § 101 analyses of process claims is sound."
(citing Benson, Flook, and Diehr)).
159. See id. at 1012 (Rader, J., dissenting) ("[S]ection 101's term 'process' contains no
hint of an exclusion for certain types of methods. This court today nonetheless holds that a
process is eligible only if it falls within certain subsets of 'process.' Ironically the Patent Act
itself specifically defines 'process' without any of these judicial innovations. 35 U.S.C.
§ 100(b). Therefore, as Diehr commands, this court should refrain from creating new circuitous
judge-made tests."); id. at 1011 ("Much of the court's difficulty lies in its reliance on dicta taken
out of context from numerous Supreme Court opinions dealing with the technology of the past.
In other words, as innovators seek the path to the next tech no-revolution, this court ties our
patent system to dicta from an industrial age decades removed from the bleeding edge. A direct
reading of the Supreme Court's principles and cases on patent eligibility would yield the one-
sentence resolution suggested above."); id. ("Because Bilski claims merely an abstract idea, this
court affirms the Board's rejection.").
160. See id. at 959-60 ("The second articulation we now revisit is the 'useful, concrete, and
tangible result' language associated with State Street. . . .The basis for this language in State
Street and Alappat was that the Supreme Court has explained that 'certain types of mathematical
subject matter, standing alone, represent nothing more than abstract ideas until reduced to some
type of practical application.' To be sure, a process tied to a particular machine, or transforming
or reducing a particular article into a different state or thing, will generally produce a 'concrete'
and 'tangible' result as those terms were used in our prior decisions. But while looking for 'a
useful, concrete and tangible result' may in many instances provide useful indications of
whether a claim is drawn to a fundamental principle or a practical application of such a
principle, that inquiry is insufficient to determine whether a claim is patent-eligible under § 101.
And it was certainly never intended to supplant to supplant the Supreme Court's test. Therefore,
we also conclude that the 'useful, concrete and tangible result' inquiry is inadequate and
reaffirm that the machine-or-transformation test outlined by the Supreme Court is the proper test
to apply.") (internal citations omitted).
161. See Patent Reform Act of 2010, Manager's Amendment to S. 515, 11 lth Cong. § 100
(2010).
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reform efforts, focused mainly on procedural changes, 16 2  have
triggered a political firestorm as well-funded interest groups on both
sides of the most important issues enlist the help of sympathetic
representatives on Capitol Hill.163 Perhaps because of the competing
interests on the many sides of the debate, legislative reform of the
Patent Act has proven to be a politically charged process. Both houses
of Congress have addressed the issue of patent reform no less than
four times in the past five years. 164
While Congress continues to debate patent-reform proposals, the
Supreme Court has reasserted itself. Recent opinions have reshaped or
discarded many rules announced by the Federal Circuit, including
those relevant to obviousness,165  declaratory judgment actions, 166
permanent injunctions,167 the patent exhaustion doctrine,s and now
with Bilski, the scope of patentability.1 6 9 In several of these decisions,
the Court follows a decidedly minimalist bent, drawing back several
of the Federal Circuit's judicially-created doctrines with a view
towards restricting the boundaries of the law to statutory or long-
standing common-law roots. 170 For example, in eBay, the Court
rejected the Federal Circuit's categorical test for permanent
injunctions, declaring the test departed from long-standing
162. See id Changes to the current system by the proposed Patent Reform Act of 2010
include: replacing the "first to invent" approach to patent ownership with a "first inventor to
file" standard, id at § 100; permitting third parties to submit comments on patent applications
directly to the PTO prior to a patent being granted, id. at § 301; providing for two specific post-
grant review processes during which third parties can challenge a patent, id at §§ 311-19, 321-
29; and further clarifying issues relating to damages and willful infringement, id at § 284. See
also Editorial, A Smart Idea: The Patent Reform Act, THE WASHINGTON POST, May, 20, 2010,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com /wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/19/AR2010051904490.html; see also Stephen Albainy-Jenei, The
Patent Reform Act of2010: A Substitute S. 515, PATENT BARISTAS, Mar. 5, 2010,
http://www.patentbaristas.com/archives/2010/03/05/ the-patent-reform-act-of-20 10-a-substitute-
s-515/. Patent Reform Act of 2010: An Overview, PATENTLY-O, Mar. 8, 2010,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/03/patent-reforn-act-of-201 0-an-overview.html.
163. Kim Hart, Tech Industry Splinters Over Patent Reform Proposal, THE HILL, Mar. 9,
2010, http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/85515-tech-industry-splinters-over-
patent-reform-proposal.
164. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005); Patent Reform Act
of 2007, H.R. 1908, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, S.
515, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act of 2010, S. 515 111th Cong (2010).
165. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
166. See Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
167. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
168. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007); Quanta Computer, Inc. v.
LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
169. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010).
170. See Kevin E. Noonan, The Supreme Court, In re Bilski and the Lingering Question of
Labcorp v. Metabolite, PATENTDOCS.ORG, Jun. 1, 2009,
http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/06/the-supreme-court-in-re-bilski-and-the-lingering-question-
of-labcorp-v-metabolite.html.
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principles.' 7 1 Prior to eBay, as the Federal Circuit observed, it was
"the general rule that an injunction will issue when infringement has
been adjudged, absent a sound reason for denying it."' 7 2 But in all
other cases, federal courts applied a traditional four-factor test when
assessing a request for a permanent injunction. 173 Invoking a
minimalist rationale, the Supreme Court dismissed the Federal
Circuit's categorical rule: "As this Court has long recognized, 'a
major departure from the long tradition of equity practice should not
be lightly implied.' Nothing in the Patent Act indicates that Congress
intended such a departure. To the contrary, the Patent Act expressly
provides that injunctions 'may' issue 'in accordance with the
principles of equity."'l
74
This trend continued in subsequent Supreme Court cases in the
patent area, including KSR, which similarly pared back Federal
Circuit case law defining when an invention is unpatentable for
obviousness.s7 5 The Federal Circuit had earlier established a rule that
required a party challenging a patent on obviousness grounds to
demonstrate a "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" to combine
known elements explicitly within the cited prior art references. 176 But
the Supreme Court rejected this mandatory formulation as
inconsistent with the underlying patent statute and its long-standing
precedent. 177 Foreshadowing its decision in Bilski, the Court deployed
a judicially minimalist methodology to create a more flexible
obviousness rule:
"[t]he diversity of inventive pursuits and of modern technology
counsels against limiting the analysis in this way. [. . . ] Granting
patent protection to advances that would occur in the ordinary
course without real innovation retards progress and may, in the
171. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391-92.
172. Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citing W.L.
Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
173. The four factor test: "(1) that [the patentee] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a
remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction." See, e.g., eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (internal citations omitted).
174. Id. at 391-92 (internal citations omitted).
175. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 399 (2007).
176. Id at 414, 418.
177. Id. at 415-16 ("We begin by rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of Appeals....
[Olur cases have set forth an expansive and flexible approach inconsistent with the way the
Court of Appeals applied its TSM test here. . . . For over a half century, the Court has held that a
'patent for a combination which only unites old elements with no change in their respective
functions ... obviously withdraws what is already known into the field of its monopoly and
diminishes the resources available to skillful men."') (quoting Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950)).
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case of patents combining previously known elements, deprive
prior inventions of their value and utility."178
E. Bilski Redux: The Supreme Court Eliminates Another
Bright-Line Test
In January 2009, Bilski petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari seeking to overturn the Federal Circuit's decision in In re
Bilski.'7 9 On June 1, 2009, the Court granted the petition 80 and on
June 28, 2010, over a year later, it handed down its opinion. Bilski
reflects a Court divided by the controversial issues surrounding the
patentability of new technologies. The Bilski ruling is composed of no
less than three separate opinions, comprising a majority and
plurality,1 82 along with two concurrences.8 3  Although the Supreme
Court affirmed the ultimate determination that the patent in Bilski was
invalid under § 101, the opinion rejected the Federal Circuit's efforts
to apply an extra-statutory, rigid framework to the flexible
patentability inquiry.184
1. The Bilski Majority and Plurality
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, focused closely on the
text of the Patent Act and defined its terms using "ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning."' 85 He stated: "This Court has
'more than once cautioned that courts should not read into the patent
laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not
178. Id at 419.
179. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 1, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/bilski-files/2007-
1130uspto opposition to certiorari.pdf. Parties seeking review by the Supreme Court do not
have a right of review; they must file a petition for writ of certiorari. See Sup. CT. R. 10
("Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for a
writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons.").
180. Questions Presented, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/08-00964qp.pdf.
181. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010).
182. Justice Scalia did not join sections II.B.2 and II.C.2 of Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion. Id. at 3223
183. Id. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor took issue with the majority's
analysis of the "abstract idea" exclusion, as well as the ultimate conclusion that business
methods are patentable in any form. Id. at 3231-32 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
184. See id. at 3223-28. See also Steven Seidenberg, Standing by Its Flexible Standards,
ABA JOURNAL, Aug. 1, 2010, available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/standing byits flexiblestandards/ ("Breyer, writing for himself and a fifth justice,
Scalia, savaged the [Federal Circuit's] test, writing that its application resulted in 'the granting
of patents that ranged from the somewhat ridiculous to the truly absurd.' Because five justices
are strongly against the State Street test, the Federal Circuit is unlikely to revive it, most experts
agree.").
185. Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3226 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)).
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expressed.' In patent law, as in all statutory construction, '[u]nless
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning."" 8 6 Justice Kennedy observed that
the "machine-or-transformation" test endorsed by the Federal Circuit
appears nowhere in the statutory text of the Patent Act, stating that the
test may provide a useful "clue" to patentability, but it cannot be the
sole test of patentability."'
In a plurality opinion, the Court explained the danger of relying
solely on inflexible tests.'88 In accord with the fundamentally liberal
scope of § 101, a rigid test not supported by the statute may prohibit
unforeseen innovations of the Information Age.1 8 9 As a case in point,
the opinion cites the development of software programs: "it was once
forcefully argued that until recent times, 'well-established principles
of patent law probably would have prevented the issuance of a valid
patent on almost any conceivable computer program."' 90 Because the
use of rigid tests would likely amount to a categorical ban on
186. Id. (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182; Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315
(1980) (some internal quotation marks omitted)).
187. Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3226-27. Compare to the Enlarged Board of Appeals finding that a
finding of a physical impact on a real world object may be sufficient but is not a necessary to
avoid 52(2) exclusion. Referral G03/08, supra note 1, at 50.
188. Notably, Teles, a German high-technology company, submitted an amicus brief in
Bilski v. Kappos which analyzed the patentability questions at issue from a European
perspective. This analysis largely presaged the opinions of the plurality and the majority and
argued that the law on patentability in the United States and Europe was in fact harmonized.
Citing to statutory and long-standing precedent of the Supreme Court, Teles argued that
standards for the patenting of processes should be broadly applied and dynamically considered,
limited only by the three common-law exclusions of patentable subject matter. Foreshadowing
the policy consideration cited by the plurality, Teles specifically cites the need for a flexible
system that can accommodate cutting-edge technologies of a non-physical nature. Brief for
Teles AG as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, at 2, 12, 15-16, Bilski v. Kappos, 130
S.Ct. 3218 (2010).
189. Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3227-28 ("A categorical rule denying patent protection for
'inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress . . .would frustrate the purposes of the patent
law.' . . . Section 101's terms suggest that new technologies may call for new inquiries.")
(quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980)); Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3227
("Section 101 is a 'dynamic provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen inventions.")
(quoting J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer HiBred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 135 (2001)).
Notably, the Enlarged Board of Appeal embraced the same logic in justifying the EPO's ever-
shifting jurisprudence regarding the patentability of new technologies. C.f Referral G03/08,
supra note 1, at 18-19 ("Particularly in the field of new technologies, the Technical Boards often
have to subject their established case law to critical review .... It is entirely conceivable that
the interpretation of undefined legal terms in light of the EPC's purpose and principles will
necessitate drawing further distinctions which, depending on what they include or exclude, may
determine whether a patent is granted or refused in a specific case."). The Supreme Court and
the Enlarged Board clearly shared the same objective: developing a flexible methodology
capable of recognizing new forms of innovation while preserving the integrity of the patent
system.
190. Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3227 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 195 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
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otherwise viable, though unanticipated, inventions that the statutory
text could support, tests such as the "machine-or-transformation" test
are only useful indicators of patentability. 91
Having swept away decades of Federal Circuit precedent, the
Court analyzed Bilski's business method claim using the analytical
framework provided by the foundational cases: Benson, Flook, and
Diehr. The Court concluded that independent claims one and four of
the Bilski patent attempt to claim the concept of hedging-an
unpatentable, abstract idea.1 92 The remaining dependent claims
merely limit the abstract idea to a specific field of use or add "token
post-solution components:" 93
In light of these precedents, it is clear that petitioners' application
is not a patentable "process." Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners'
application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk: "Hedging is a fundamental economic practice long
prevalent in our system of commerce and taught in any
introductory finance class." The concept of hedging, described in
claim I and reduced to a mathematical formula in claim 4, is an
unpatentable abstract idea, just like the algorithms at issue in
Benson and Flook. Allowing petitioners to patent risk hedging
would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would
effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.
Petitioners' remaining claims are broad examples of how hedging
can be used in commodities and energy markets. [. . .] [T]hese
claims add even less to the underlying abstract principle than the
invention in Flook did, for the Flook invention was at least directed
to the narrower domain of signaling dangers in operating a
catalytic converter. 194
The Court also noted that Bilski's claims, if allowed, would pre-empt
the use of the abstract concept of hedging in all fields.195 In other
words, Bilski's claims suffer from the same flaw as the methods
claimed in Flook.'9 6 Diehr established a limiting principle that
applications of abstract ideas or laws of nature may be patentable, but
the Court does not explain why the application of Bilski's claims to
energy market hedging is insufficient to satisfy this limiting principle,
other than to point out that this post-solution activity adds less than
191. Id. at 3225-28.
192. Id at 3231.
193. Id (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)).
194. Id. (internal citations omitted).
195. Id.
196. Id.
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the claims in Flook. 97
In addition to ruling on the standard of patentability for process
claims generally, the Court confronted the specific issue of the
patentability of business methods. The Court held that at least some
business method patents are patentable, but its analysis leaves the
future viability of these patents in doubt.198 Continuing on its
minimalist path, the Court drew on § 101 and applied strict principles
of statutory interpretation. Because the term "method" is within
§ 100(b)'s definition of "process," and it is not limited in any fashion,
the Court acknowledged that the term may include some form of
business methods.199 Further, the Court was "unaware of any
argument that the 'ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,' of
'method' excludes business methods."2 00 Also, according to the
Court, § 273(b)(1), which provides a defense of prior use to the
infringement of such patents, undermined an interpretation of the
Patent Act that would categorically exclude business method patents
from patentability. 2 0 1 As the Court noted, a conclusion that business
methods were not patentable under any circumstances "would render
§ 273 meaningless[,] violat[ing] the canon against interpreting any
statutory provision in a manner that would render another provision
superfluous."2 02 The majority recognized the threshold patentability
of business methods, but stopped short of pronouncing a broad scope
of their patentability, noting that "while § 273 appears to leave open
the possibility of some business method patents, it does not suggest
broad patentability of such claimed inventions."20 3
The plurality was far less enthusiastic about extending the
patentability of business methods. It noted that, though the
"Information Age empowers people with new capacities to perform
statistical analyses and mathematical calculations [] for more efficient
performance of a vast number of business tasks .. . [i]f a high enough
bar is not set, . . . patent examiners and courts could be flooded with
claims that would put a chill on creative endeavor and dynamic
change."204 It also suggested that if the Federal Circuit fashioned a
narrower rule defining the scope of patentable business methods, it
197. See Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3229-31.
198. See id. at 3226-28.
199. Id. at 3228.
200. Id. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)).
201. Id
202. Id. at 3228-29 (citing Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1566 (2009)).
203. Id. at 3229.
204. Id.
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might be in accord with controlling precedent. 2 0 5
2. The Bilski Concurrence
Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, agreed with the Court's
rejection of Bilski's claim under § 101, but sharply attacked the
majority's interpretation of the term "process" and its holding that
business methods are patentable.206 More relevant to the topic of this
Article, the Stevens concurrence scolded the Court for importing non-
Section 101 inquiries into its "abstract idea" analysis:
[I]n its discussion of an issue not contained in the questions
presented-whether the particular series of steps in petitioners'
application is an abstract idea-the Court uses language that could
suggest a shift in our approach to that issue. [ ... ] It is true, as the
Court observes, that petitioners' application is phrased broadly.
But claim specification is covered by § 112, not § 101; and if a
series of steps constituted an unpatentable idea merely because it
was described without sufficient specificity, the Court could be
calling into question some of our own prior decisions. At points,
the opinion suggests that novelty is the clue. But the fact that
hedging is "long prevalent in our system of commerce," cannot
justify the Court's conclusion, as "the proper construction of
§ 101 ... does not involve the familiar issu[e] of novelty" that
arises under § 102. At other points, the opinion for a plurality
suggests that the analysis turns on the category of patent involved
[](courts should use the abstract-idea rule as a "too[l]" to set "a
high enough bar" "when considering patent applications of this
sort"). But we have never in the past suggested that the inquiry
varies by subject matter.207
Justice Stevens expressed concern that conflating the statutory
requirements of patentability, as the majority opinion appears to,
could signal a shift from the established analysis of the "abstract idea"
exception. 208
In addition to faulting the majority for basing its conclusion on
novelty and definiteness issues rather than "abstract idea"
considerations, Stevens also noted that the majority did not provide a
reasonable account of why Bilski's claim is unpatentable under the
205. Id.
206. See Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3231-58 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). This feeling is
also reflected across the Atlantic where the idea of business method patents received a chilly
reception. See Bray, supra note 9, 11 9-11 (citing Amendment 6 to the proposed EU Directive
(see discussion infra Part I-B)).
207. Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3235-26 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added)
(internal footnote and citations omitted).
208. Id. at 3235 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
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foundational cases of Benson, Flook, and Diehr:
Although I happen to agree that petitioners seek to patent an
abstract idea, the Court does not show how this conclusion follows
"clear[ly][]" from our case law. The patent now before us is not for
"[a] principle, in the abstract, " or a 'fundamental truth. " Nor
does it claim the sort of phenomenon of nature or abstract idea
that was embodied by the mathematical formula at issue in
[Benson] and in Flook.... The Court construes petitioners' claims
on processes for pricing as claims on "the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk," and thus discounts the
application's discussion of what sorts of data to use, and how to
analyze those data, as mere "token postsolution components[]." In
other words, the Court artificially limits petitioners' claims to
hedging, and then concludes that hedging is an abstract idea rather
than a term that describes a category of processes including
petitioners' claims. Why the Court does this is never made clear.
Although the Stevens concurrence expresses surprise and concern at
these analytical flaws, such imprecision has long been a feature of
Supreme Court jurisprudence on "patentable subject matter."2 10
Indeed, as discussed in more detail in Part III, these perceived
failings, both in applying the Court's precedent to "patentable subject
matter" cases and in articulating a decision under purely "subject
matter exception" terms, disguise an underlying consistency in the
Court's jurisprudence.
In Bilski, the Supreme Court merely refined the flexible test for
patentability that it has been using since Benson. Still, the opinion is
remarkable for at least two reasons. First, the Court's approach to
statutory construction could not have been more dissimilar to the
method of European jurists: rather than creating whole new constructs
that reshaped statutory text, the Court took a minimalist approach and
strictly tied its analysis to the statutory text and certain "excluded
categories" of "patentable subject matter" defined in century-old
cases. Second, in its effort to develop a flexible analysis that could
adapt to modern innovation, the Supreme Court adopted a
methodology that anticipated the model implemented in Europe. The
patentability analysis endorsed by the Court created a flexible and
adaptable method for assessing whether innovations in emerging,
nontraditional technologies are worthy of patent protection.
209. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted).
210. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978);
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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III. CUTTING TO THE STATUTORY BONE: THE EMERGENCE
OF A TWO-STEP PATENT ANALYSIS IN THE UNITED
STATES
Over the past half-century, evolving technologies have pushed
the boundaries of established patent law and outpaced the
legislature's ability to respond. In this vacuum, courts were left with
the difficult task of applying antiquated patentability regimes to new
technologies, increasingly of a non-physical nature. In Europe, courts
and administrative bodies began this struggle confronted by an
underlying statute that contained a blanket exclusion of software
programs. Through judicial activism and a strained statutory
interpretation, jurists reshaped the plain language of the statute to the
point where the "excludable category" inquiry is a mere formality. In
place of excluded categories, European courts and administrative
bodies substitute the flexible and formidable barriers of novelty and
"inventiveness" to ensure that only patent-worthy inventions receive
patent protection. Conversely, the Supreme Court has embraced
judicial minimalism to pare back the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence.
In doing so, the Court cut to the statutory bone, exposing-without
explicitly articulating-a broad, permissive grant of "patentable
subject matter" (under § 101) and a series of restrictive requirements
for patent-eligibility-novelty (§ 102), obviousness (§ 103), and
sufficiency of a written description (§ 112).
These fundamentally different approaches to statutory
interpretation implemented by the Boards of Appeal in Europe and
the Supreme Court in the United States yield what is essentially the
same flexible inquiry. The difference between the two approaches is
largely cosmetic. The Boards of Appeal in Europe make a crisp
distinction between (1) the analytic step of determining whether a
claimed invention is comprised solely of a category of invention
excluded from patent protection and (2) the separate step of
determining whether the invention as a whole is sufficiently useful,
novel, nonobvious, and circumscribed to be patentable. The Supreme
Court cases implicitly apply the same two-step analysis; but the crisp
distinction between the two steps found in European directives is
often missing from the Supreme Court's complex and challenging
opinions on patentability. Examining the implicit distinction brings
the Court's underlying methodology into sharper focus.
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A. The Structure and Precision of the Two-Step Analysis
As discussed in Part I, the EPC provides a statutory framework
that describes a narrow, exclusionary view of software patents. As the
Information Age developed it became evident that new technologies
required the language of the law to adapt. 2 11 In response to
technological innovation, the EPO Boards of Appeal adopted a
flexible interpretation of the EPC and set about reworking the
standard of patentability. 2 12 Whereas earlier European precedent
conflated the "technical character" test inquiries of subject matter
exclusion (the "technical character" step) and novelty (the "inventive
step"), the current two-step analysis endorsed by the EPO clearly
delineates these as separate inquiries. Further, the EPO set about
narrowing the scope of the "technical character" requirement to the
point that it is a formality.213
This evolution culminated in the recent EBoA opinion on
Referral G 03/08, in which the EBoA affirmatively acknowledged
that the subject matter exclusion inquiry under Article 52 can be
overcome by recitation of "technicality" alone.214 The minimization
of subject matter as a patentability filter necessitates a robust
"inventiveness" inquiry, one which is inherently flexible and culls
unpatentable discoveries more precisely than an inflexible and
arbitrary subject matter exclusion.
B. The Two-Step Analysis Applied in European Directives is
Implicit in the Methodology Used by the United States
Supreme Court in Benson, Flook, Diehr, and Bilski
At the core of all Supreme Court patentability precedent is 35
U.S.C. § 101, which provides "[w]hoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter ... may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title." 2 15 The Court's various patentability
opinions rest squarely on the principle that § 101 establishes a
permissive grant for "process[es], machine[s], manufacture[s], or
composition[s] of matter" 216 bound only by the extra-textual excluded
subject matter of laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
211. See Referral G03/08, supra note 1, at 18-20.
212. See id. at 32-33.
213. See id.
214. Id.
215. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
216. Id.
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ideas.2 17 The Supreme Court has cautioned that the analysis under
§ 101:
... turns entirely on the proper construction of § 101 of the Patent
Act, which describes the subject matter that is eligible for patent
protection. It does not involve the familiar issues of novelty and
obviousness that routinely arise under §§ 102 and 103 when the
validity of patents is challenged. 218
This dicta from Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Diehr can be
read as explicitly prohibiting the importation of §§ 102, 103, and 112
analyses when considering patent-eligibility under § 101.219
The Court's caution, however, is consistent with a two-step
analysis that recognizes a sharp delineation between the first prong of
the analysis (which looks at the defined categories of protection under
§ 101 and the common-law "subject matter" exclusions that have
been a part of § 101 analysis for more than a century), and the second
prong (which applies a traditional analysis under §§ 102, 103, and
112). Consistent with a minimalist statutory interpretation of § 101
and the literal meaning of the common-law exclusions, the first prong
sets a low bar. Anything that fits within the four broad categories of
"patentable subject matter" (processes, machines, manufactures, and
compositions of matter) and does not, in its entirety, comprise one of
the excluded categories (laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas) clears the threshold step. If a claim includes elements
from the excluded categories, but applies the exclusions to a broader
invention, the analysis moves to the second step-a rigorous
application of the traditional conditions to patentability under §§ 102,
103, and 112. The second step presents the primary barrier to
220patentability.
217. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010). ("The Court's precedents provide
three specific exceptions to § 101's broad patent-eligibility principles: 'laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas.' While these exceptions are not required by the statutory text,
they are consistent with the notion that a patentable process must be 'new and useful.' And, in
any case, these exceptions have defined the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare
decisis going back 150 years.") (internal citations omitted).
218. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 (1978).
219. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189-90 (1981).
220. In practice, the two-step analysis will be conducted in the first instance by a patent
examiner in the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") during patent prosecution. Indeed, in the
latest interim guidance to examiners for determining subject matter eligibility following Bilski,
the PTO stresses the relative importance of the traditional tests of patentability: "Examiners are
reminded that § 101 is not the sole tool for determining patentability; where a claim
encompasses an abstract idea, sections 102, 103, and 112 will provide additional tools for
ensuring that the claim meets the conditions for patentability [as set forth by the Court in Bilski].
... Therefore, examiners should avoid focusing on issues of patent-eligibility under § 101 to the
detriment of considering an application for compliance with the requirements of §§ 102, 103,
and 112, and should avoid treating an application solely on the basis of patent-eligibility under
2011] "PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER" AFTER BIL SKI 287
For instance, the concern that an invention may be claimed so
broadly as to wholly preempt the use of excluded subject matter is
met by an application of § 112.221 If a claim is drafted so broadly as to
encompass the entirety of a non-statutory element in practice, it will
fail for lack of definiteness or sufficiency of a written description.
Furthermore, a proper application of these traditional provisions, in
keeping with KSR, should not allow unworthy inventions to slip
through the cracks of the mechanistic prior art definitions of § 102.
As the Supreme Court made clear, recourse to common sense is
required:
Rigid preventative rules that deny recourse to common sense are
neither necessary under, nor consistent with, this Court's case
law.222
The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic
conception or by overemphasis on the importance of published
articles and the explicit content of issued patents. The diversity of
inventive pursuits and of modem technology counsels against
limiting the analysis in this way.... Granting patent protection to
advances that would occur in the ordinary course without real
innovation retards progress and may, in the case of patents
combining previously known elements, deprive prior inventions of
their value or utility. 23
A common sense application of the novelty and nonobviousness
requirements will result in the rejection or invalidation of non-
§ 101 except in the most extreme cases." Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter
Eligibility for Process Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43922, 43922 - 43924
(Jul. 27, 2010) (though the instructions for the exclusionary test itself largely reflect
considerations relevant to the "machine-or-transformation" test). District court judges may also
be called upon to apply the two-step analysis when hearing motions for summary judgment. In
most cases, a court will have discretion to apply the most appropriate statutory provision when
considering the validity of a patent, guided by the parties' arguments, the record before the
court, and common sense. See King Pharms., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., Nos. 2009-1437, 2009-
1438, 2010 WL 3001333, *10 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 2, 2010) ("As an appellate court, we are not
limited to a district court's stated reasons for invalidating claims and can affirm a grant of
summary judgment on any ground supported by the record and adequately raised below.")
(finding a subset of claims anticipated where the lower court rejection was based solely on
§ 101). Litigants are advised that they should bring claims under all available provisions to
afford the court an opportunity to rule on all aspects of the invalidity defense. There may be
circumstances where a validity determination under §§ 102, 103, and/or § 112 requires a finding
of fact, properly for the jury, that impacts the court's ability to rule. This is true, of course, any
time a motion for summary judgment is brought to invalidate a patent. An analysis of whether
questions of fact are more common when considering patentability under § 101 versus under
§§ 102, 103, or 112 is beyond the scope of this article.
221. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
222. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 403 (2007).
223. Id. at 419.
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inventive combinations of algorithms with established manufacturing
steps, or mundane business applications that modify commercial
activity in trivial ways. This straightforward analysis requires nothing
more than a strict application of the Patent Act and the instructions of
the statute. Accordingly, as discussed below, the approach is
consistent with what the Supreme Court has done for the last thirty
years.
1. The Two-Step Analysis Applied in Benson
As discussed in more detail in Part II, supra, the Court in Benson
considered a patent that claimed a method for a computer that
converted binary-coded decimals into pure binary numbers.224 The
Court concluded that the algorithm included in the method claim had
no other practical use other than implementation in a computer and,
critically, would wholly preempt the use of that algorithm in any other
application.22 5
The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial
practical application except in connection with a digital computer,
which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent
would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical
effect would be a patent on the algorithm. 226
The Court held that a mathematical formula, without substantial
practical applications except in connection with a digital computer, is
not patentable.227 The Court reaches this commonsense result without
explicitly parsing which elements of the claims fail under § 101 and
which fail under other sections of the Patent Act, but such precision
seems unwarranted in Benson where the patent claims "were not
limited to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any particular
end use" 2 28 and the patent essentially began and ended with the
mathematical formula. In the Court's view, the point of novelty lived
entirely in the unpatentable algorithm so the patent failed under the
first step of the analysis.
In the opinion, however, the Court appears to consider
requirements outside § 101 in coming to its conclusion that a
machine-implemented algorithm is not patentable under § 101:
The method sought to be patented varies the ordinary arithmetic
steps a human would use by changing the order of the steps,
224. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972).
225. Id. at 71-72,
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 64.
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changing the symbolism for writing the multiplier used in some
steps, and by taking subtotals after each successive operation. The
mathematical procedures can be carried out in existing computers
long in use, no new machinery being necessary. And, as noted,
they can also be performed without a computer.
If the Court had determined that Benson's claimed invention included
the independent element of running the mathematical procedures on a
computer, the text quoted above suggests the Court would have found
the application obvious and unpatentable under § 103. Instead, the
Court concluded the mathematical formula was the only inventive
aspect of the claim so it looked no further than § 101.230
2. The Two-Step Analysis Applied in Flook
In Flook, the patent at issue attempted to claim a method for
using an algorithm to monitor a catalytic conversion process in the
petrochemical industry. 231 As the Supreme Court later explained in
Diehr, Flook stands for the proposition that the prohibition on
patenting abstract ideas cannot be circumvented by limiting its use to
a specific technological environment or adding insignificant post-
solution activity. 2 32 This rule has been read as a clarification of
Benson's reasoning that method patents should not preempt the use of
mathematical formula.
The majority opinion opens by presenting the question of the
case: "whether the identification of a limited category of useful,
though conventional, post-solution applications of such a formula
makes respondent's method eligible for patent protection." 2 33 The
Court makes clear what it means by "conventional": the invention
only applies "conventional methods of changing alarm limits" to a
"mathematical algorithm or formula." 2 34 The Court found that the
mathematical algorithm was an objectionable "abstract idea" that,
standing alone, is excluded from "patentable subject matter" by
longstanding precedent.235 What remains is a "conventional"
application of the algorithm in a method for changing alarm limits
that, itself, was well-known in the prior art.
As in Benson, the Court in Flook appears to import elements of
229. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (dicta).
230. See id. at 71-72.
231. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585-86 (1978).
232. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981).
233. Flook, 437 U.S. at 585 (emphasis added).
234. Id. at 585-86.
235. See id. at 594-95.
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§ 102 and § 103 analyses into its assessment of whether the patent
was patentable under § 101:
Respondent's process is unpatentable under § 101, not because it
contains a mathematical algorithm as one component, but because
once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the
application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable
invention. Even though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical
formula may be well known, an inventive application of the
principle may be patented Conversely, the discovery of such a
phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is some other
inventive concept in its application. 236
The Court concluded that the respondent's application contained no
inventive aspect and, accordingly, was not a patentable invention. The
Court recognized that "[t]he chemical processes involved in catalytic
conversion of hydrocarbons are well known, as are the practice of
monitoring the chemical process variables, the use of alarm limits to
trigger alarms, the notion that alarm limit values must be recomputed
and readjusted, and the use of computers for 'automatic monitoring-
alarming. "237
The respondent charged the Court with "improperly import[ing]
into § 101 the considerations of 'inventiveness' which are the proper
concerns of §§ 102 and 103.",238 The Court responded in two ways.
First, it answered that permitting patentees to establish "patentable
subject matter" under § 101 merely by adding a process element to a
claim that is based on an abstract idea, creates an environment where
"the determination of patentable subject matter depend[s] simply on
the draftsman's art and would ill serve the principles underlying the
prohibition against patents for 'ideas' or phenomena of nature." 239
But the Court's concern is unwarranted. The "draftsman's art" may be
sufficient to carry an unpatentable abstraction beyond the threshold
step in the two-step analysis, by adding to the claims an application,
but a "conventional" application of an abstract idea will not create a
patentable invention. The application must still survive the
armamentarium of additional conditions to patentability under the
Patent Act. Unless the application of the abstract idea in the claimed
invention is useful, novel, nonobvious, and clearly circumscribed by
the patent specification, the patent will not issue.
Next, the Court responded to the concern that the patent may be
236. Id. at 593-94 (emphasis added).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 592.
239. Id. at 593.
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found objectionable merely because it includes an unpatentable
"abstract idea" as one element of its claims. 24 0 The Court responded
unequivocally that the "algorithm is assumed to be within the prior
art," but "[elven though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical
formula may be well known, an inventive application of the principle
may be patented."2 4 1 In other words, if an invention is to be
patentable, the application of phenomena of nature, mathematical
formula, or an abstract idea must independently be inventive and
novel.242
240. See id at 593-94.
241. Id. at 594 (emphasis added). See also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)
("While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention, a
novel and useful structure created with the aid of scientific truth may be.") (quoting Mackay Co.
v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939)); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) ("It is
now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.") (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted).
242. In Flook, the Court suggests in dicta that Morse requires that the non-statutory subject
matter and the application of that subject matter in a method should be assumed to be within the
prior art for purposes of an analysis under § 101. Flook, 437 U.S. at 595 (citing O'Reilly v.
Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 117, 119-20 (1853)). Morse does not support this assumption. In Morse, the
Court takes the unpatentable electro-magnetic force to be well-known and then performs a
standard patent-law analysis on the application of the force ("And it is the high praise of
Professor Morse, that he has been able, by a new combination of known powers, of which
electro-magnetism is one, to discover a method by which intelligible marks or signs may be
printed at a distance. And for the method or process thus discovered, he is entitled to a patent.
But he has not discovered that the electro-magnetic current, used as motive power, in any other
method, and with any other combination, will do as well."). Morse, 56 U.S. at 117. The Court
found the Morse claims failed for what is now described as an insufficient written description:
It is impossible to misunderstand the extent of this claim. [Morse] claims the
exclusive right to every improvement where the motive power is the electric or
galvanic current, and the result is the marking or printing intelligible characters,
signs, or letters at a distance. If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by
what process or machinery the result is accomplished. For aught that we now
know some future inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a
mode of writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic
current, without using any part of the process or combination set forth in the
plaintiff's specification.
. . . [Morse] says he does not confine his claim to the machinery or parts of
machinery, which he specifies; but claims for himself a monopoly in its use,
however developed, for the purpose of printing at a distance. New discoveries in
physical science may enable him to combine it with new agents and new
elements, and by that means attain the object in a manner superior to the present
process and altogether different from it. And ifhe can secure the exclusive use by
his present patent he may vary it with every new discovery and development of
the science, and need place no description of the new manner, process, or
machinery, upon the records of the patent office. . . . [H]e claims an exclusive
right to use a manner and process which he has not described and indeed had not
invented, and therefore could not describe when he obtained his patent. The
Court is of opinion that the claim is too broad, and not warranted by law.
Id. at 112-13 (emphasis added). It seems the Supreme Court applied a two-step analysis as early
as 1853. See also Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 ("He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon
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In the case of the Flook patent, the Court found that "[t]he
chemical processes ... are well known, as are the monitoring of
process variables, the use of alarms limits to trigger alarms, the notion
that alarm limit values must be recomputed and readjusted, and the
use of computers for 'automatic process monitoring."' 243 The Court
effectively drew on novelty and obviousness considerations, noting
that the elements of the patent other than the mathematical algorithm
were well-known in the prior art. The Court also recognized that the
patent specification did not "explain how to select the appropriate
margin of safety, the weighing factor, or any other of the other
variables"244 that it might use to trigger the alarms, and thus
recognized that the claimed invention also failed under the written
description requirements of § 112.
Justice Stewart, in his dissenting opinion, lamented the failure of
the majority opinion to make a clear separation between its analysis
of "patentable subject matter" under § 101 and the assessment of
other elements of patentability. Justice Stewart noted that the majority
opinion:
... strikes what seems to me to be [a] damaging blow at basic
principles of patent law by importing into its inquiry under 35
U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of novelty and inventiveness. Section 101
is concerned only with subject matter patentability. Whether a
patent will actually issue depends upon the criteria of § 102 and
§ 103, which include novelty and inventiveness, among many
others.245
But the "basic principles of patent law" are not damaged by the
majority opinion. The Court identified the elements of the claim that
are unpatentable under § 101 (abstract ideas, laws of nature, physical
phenomena) but also properly recognized that the application of those
elements, as described by the patent, may be independently
patentable. The Court then looked at the application of the
unpatentable algorithm in the claimed invention and found that the
application was also well-known or obvious ("conventional methods
of changing alarm limits"), 2 4 6 effectively finding that the application
of the algorithm was independently unpatentable under §§ 102 and
of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be an
invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new
and useful end.") (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
243. Flook, 437 U.S. at 584.
244. Id. at 586.
245. Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
246. Id. at 585-86.
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103. The Court also recognized that the application of the algorithm
described in the method failed to explain how to select key data points
used in the formula,247 implicating a potential rejection of the patent
for falling short of the written description requirement under § 112.
The Flook patent thus cleared the first hurdle to patentability but
stumbled on the second.
3. The Two-Step Analysis Applied in Diehr
The invention at issue in Diehr was a method for curing rubber
that included the use of an algorithm as one component of the
process.248 The Court distinguishes the method in Diehr from the
unpatentable method claimed in Flook:
The claims [in Flook] were drawn to a method for computing an
"alarm limit." . . . Using [a] formula, the updated alarm limit could
be calculated if several other variables were known. The
application, however, did not purport to explain how these other
variables were to be determined, nor did it purport "to contain any
disclosure relating to the chemical processes at work, the
monitoring of process variables, or the means of setting off an
alarm or adjusting an alarm system. All that it provides is a
formula for computing an updated alarm limit."249
Thus, in Flook, the scope of the claimed invention was not definite, so
the claim as a whole was read as subsuming an abstract idea and
claiming large swathes of the public domain. 25 0 But this was not a
concern to Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Diehr,
who found that the claims in Diehr restricted the claimed invention to
"an industrial process for the molding of rubber products."251 The
scope of the claimed invention was sufficiently circumscribed by its
written description so the invention was patentable.
Justice Stevens did not agree. In his dissent, Justice Stevens
repeated the now-common refrain that the majority opinion ignored
the critical "distinction between the subject matter of what the
inventor claims to have discovered-the § 101 issue-and the
question whether that claimed discovery is in fact novel-the § 102
247. Id. at 586.
248. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). In Diehr, the Court again emphasizes that
"questions of whether a particular invention meets the 'novelty' requirements of 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 or the 'nonobviousness' requirements of § 103 do not affect the determination of whether
the invention falls into a category of subject matter that is eligible for patent protection under
§ 101."Id. at 176, 188-89.
249. Id. at 186-87 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 586).
250. Flook, 437 U.S. at 589-90.
251. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192-93.
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issue." 2 52 The dissenting opinion observed that the "essence of the
claimed discovery" in both Flook and Diehr "was an algorithm that
could be programmed on a digital computer," 2 5 3 which was
unpatentable under § 101. In other words, Justice Stevens concluded
the invention "discovered" by both Diehr and Flook was the
algorithm itself and the algorithm was not patentable under § 101.
But, as discussed above, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded the
invention was "an industrial process for the molding of rubber
products" of which the algorithm was only an element. It is not that
Chief Justice Rehnquist failed to appreciate the important distinction
Justice Stevens makes between discoveries that are not patentable
under § 101, because the discovery itself is of an unpatentable nature,
and discoveries that are not patentable because they are not new or
inventive under §§ 102 and 103. Rather, the majority opinion can be
read as recognizing the invention "discovered" by Diehr to be the
application of the algorithm to an industrial process for the molding
of rubber products, an application that was sufficiently novel,
nonobvious, and limited by the specification to be patentable under §§
102, 103, and 112, respectively. The Diehr patent cleared the first
hurdle because it applied the unpatentable algorithm in a potentially
patentable method for curing rubber. The patent cleared the second
hurdle because the majority of the Court found the application
sufficiently novel, nonobvious, and defined to warrant patent
protection.
4. The Two-Step Analysis Applied in Bilski
In Bilski, the Court applied the analysis developed in Benson,
Flook, and Diehr to a business method claim. 2 54 Critically, the Court
again emphasized the relationship between patent-eligibility under
§ 101 and patent-eligibility under the additional "conditions and
requirements" of the Patent Act:
The § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test. Even if
an invention qualifies as a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, in order to receive the Patent Act's
protection the claimed invention must also satisfy "the conditions
and requirements of this title." § 101. Those requirements include
that the invention be novel, see § 102, nonobvious, see § 103, and
fully and particularly described, see § 112.255
252. Id. at 211 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
253. Id at 209 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
254. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010).
255. Id. at 3225.
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The Court implicitly acknowledges the two-step nature of the patent-
eligibility analysis. First, the claimed discovery must fall into one of
the categories listed in § 101.256 Under this step, the Court must also
determine whether the invention involves the common-law categories
of excludable subject matter (laws of nature, physical phenomena,
and abstract ideas). 25 7  Second, the discovery-typically the
application of one of the excludable categories in a broader
invention-must meet the additional "conditions and requirements of
this title" referenced in § 101 (such as novelty, nonobviousness, and
full and particular description).2 58
Applying this analytical structure, the Court began by analyzing
the "four independent categories of inventions or discoveries that are
eligible for protection [under § 101]: processes, machines,
manufacturers, and compositions of matter." 2 59 The Court emphasized
that Congress took a permissive approach to patent eligibility to
encourage innovation and these categories should be interpreted
broadly.260 Consistent with Congress's intent,26 1 the Court broadly
interpreted the language of § 101 to include business method
claims.262
The Court next considered the "specific exceptions" to § 101's
broad patent-eligibility principles: laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas. Significantly, the Court draws heavily
from other "conditions and requirements of this title" in its "abstract
ideas" analysis. Applying common-law exclusions to the Bilski
patent, the Court found the claimed process not patentable because
Bilski attempted to patent the "abstract idea" of hedging risks-"a
fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of
commerce . . . ."263 To the extent the claims sought to apply the
"long-prevalent" principles of risk hedging to specific business
methods, the Court found that the claims merely "instruct the use of
well-known random analysis techniques to help establish some of the
inputs of a mathematical equation" used in the process. 264 Implicitly,
the Court suggests that application of "well-known techniques" to
256. Id
257. Id. (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
258. Id. at 3225.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Notably, the Court's analysis is also consistent with the analytical approach endorsed
by the EPO.
262. Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3229-31.
263. Id. at 3231 (citing In re Bilski, 545 F.3d, at 1013 (Rader, J., dissenting)).
264, Id.
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"long-prevalent" business practices do not satisfy the "conditions and
requirements" 26 5 of patent-eligibility defined in the Patent Act.
Accordingly, the Court found the invention claimed by Bilski
unpatentable.266
Unfortunately, by wrapping its "abstract idea" dicta in a novelty
analysis, the Court creates potential confusion. Justice Stevens calls
out the majority on this point in his concurrence, noting that the
majority opinion at various times appears to be challenging the
unacceptable breadth of the claim specification (§ 112) and the
claims' novelty (§ 102) as part of the Court's analysis of "abstract
ideas" (ostensibly under § 101).267 The imprecision is unfortunate, but
it need not create mischief for courts traveling in the wake of Bilski.
The two steps may be analyzed separately to avoid confusion.
Applying the two-step analysis to Supreme Court precedent, we
find clarity in the reticulated and challenging jurisprudence. The
analysis reveals an erosion of the subject matter patentability filter. In
the Court's latest patent ruling, the Court purports to conduct a
subject-matter analysis based on abstraction, but then proceeds to use
a novelty and aspects of a written-description analysis as the
indicators of the abstraction. The Europeans, in contrast, make a sharp
distinction between low-threshold, subject matter bars and the
rigorous, traditional barriers to patentability-usefulness, novelty,
obviousness, and a precise delineation of scope. The Supreme Court
effectively reaches this same result without the benefit of a sharp
separation.
CONCLUSION
Fundamentally different approaches to statutory interpretation
implemented by the European Patent Office and the United States
Supreme Court yield what is essentially the same flexible inquiry.
The improbable convergence suggests that the nature of the
technology itself is not only driving the need for a flexible
patentability inquiry but it is also defining the very nature of the
inquiry. Insightful jurists may attempt to create rigid tests that
accommodate technologies of the future, but it is unlikely that the
shape of future technologies will fit comfortably into neat boxes. The
EPO and the Supreme Court, each with the goal of recognizing novel
innovation while preserving the integrity of the patent system, chose
265. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
266. Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3231.
267. Id. at 3235-36 (Steven, J., concurring in judgment).
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to eschew rigid "subject matter" restrictions and promote a rigorous
and flexible application of traditional requirements of patent-
eligibility that have always served to protect only those inventions
worthy of patent protection. It is not possible or necessary to
determine whether all roads lead to this same result. The more
interesting question may be whether this is the end of the road. Will
the unknown and unknowable shape of future innovation force further
refinements on what is now, in most critical respects, a common
methodology for analyzing patent-eligibility?
* * *
